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PREFACE^ 
On September 22, 1862, President Lincoln issued the 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation warning that, unless 
the several states of the Union were restored to their 
proper relationships under the Constitution, he would proclaim 
all slaves in "'rebel" hands forever free as an act of 
military necessity. One-hundred days later, January 1, 1853, 
2 
the President issued the final Emancipation Proclamation. 
While historians have dealt with Abraham Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation as an aspect of the Civil War, 
they have given scant attention to the impact of that docu­
ment upon contemporary opinions, and indirectly to the 
effects of the decree upon the sectional attitudes toward 
the war. An exception to the general historical treatment 
^The first chapter of this study is more a background 
section than an introduction. Consequently, these prefa­
tory statements have been placed at this point in order to 
acquaint the reader with the aim, scope, and method of this 
study -
2 It should be remembered that the ta\7o Proclamations 
are in many instances considered as one in a general 
emancipation policy. If they are referred to separately, 
they will be identified as the preliminary Proclamation or 
the final Proclamation. 
of the Proclamation is the recent (1953) work by historian 
John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation. Franklin 
recreates some of the excitement aroused by the promulgation 
of Lincoln's decree, and notes the importance of the edict 
to the Negro race. Franklin's work is a valuable aid in 
gaining a clearer perspective of reactions to the 
Proclamation; this paper, however, is not a recapitulation 
of Professor Franklin's work. 
The aim in this paper is to identify and explain the 
reactions to the Emancipation Proclamation, and to evaluate 
the effect of the edict in the light of these reactions» 
The general plan is simple in form. 
Chapter one is designed as a sketch of the slavery 
controversy as it developed into a sectional dispute that 
ultimately contributed to the secession of one section from 
the Union. The purpose of presenting the background of the 
controversy is to give the reader a summary view of the 
arguments used by the proslavery and antislavery forces to 
justify their positions and to gain popular support for 
their cause. The limitations of chapter one lie in the 
fact that it is designed to give a general background of 
slavery from the time of the founding of the Federal System 
(1789), and not to elaborate on the emotions aroused by the 
slavery controversy. Some of the political, social, and 
psychological ramifications and implications of slavery 
and the program to free the slaves are merely noted; to 
have examined all of the implications would have required a 
paper of far greater breadth and depth than was intended. 
It has become fairly well established, both by the 
express claim written into the emancipation document and by 
historians of the Civil War period, that the Emancipation 
Proclamation was a war measure. There has not been, however, 
agreement as to what purpose this measure served and the 
impact it had on the general public; nor have there been 
detailed studies concerning the different contemporary views 
on the subject. Chapters two and three have been undertaken 
to present the different reactions to the Emancipation 
Proclamation by the people of the Union and the Confederacy 
respectively- The reactions cited in these two chapters have 
been, in many instances, published interpretations of the 
Proclamation designed to arouse the public to action. The 
reasons for the reception of the Proclamation by the two 
principal sections should become apparent as they are present­
ed . 
Whereas it would have been desirable to make an ex­
haustive study of the recorded impressions and responses 
V 
of different groups with regard to emancipation, the avail­
ability of material within existing library facilities, even 
combined with inter-library loan selections, has precluded 
this. These limitations have been met as well as possible 
by concentrating on three main interest groups—the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the governments, the press, and 
the military- Where it was possible to note the effect of 
the emancipation policy on private citizens, this has been 
done. 
Newspapers were selected from the largest population 
centers because they had proportionately greater 
circulations than had those in the thinly populated areas. 
An attempt, however, was made to give a cross section of 
the newspaper coverage of both the Union and the 
Confederacy. Similarly, the expressions of the adminis­
tration officials and Congressmen have been cited in order 
to provide a cross section of the opinions of government 
leaders in both the North and the South. The reactions 
recorded by private individuals in diaries and letters have 
been accepted as genuine expressions of opinion toward the 
emancipation policy. These individual views apparently had 
some effect on the emancipation policy; however, they 
served primarily to illustrate the diversity of opinions 
vi 
concerning slavery and the prospects for society after the 
Negro had been liberated. When these views involved 
prejudices, government leaders and other propagandists were 
quick to exploit the opportunity to turn the prejudices to 
their own advantage. 
Chapter two deals with effects of the Emancipation 
Proclamation upon the Union, while the third chapter deals 
with the Confederate States. The emancipation policy of 
President Lincoln is evaluated mainly in the light of the 
sectional reactions to it. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Emancipation of the Negro race in the United States 
was not merely an accidental by-product of a great civil 
war. It was the result of long years of determined labor 
by those who dedicated themselves to use all means to 
remove the fetters of slavery. Those so dedicated came to 
be known as abolitionists and antislavery crusaders. As 
with all crusades, there obviously was an opposing group 
that must be converted—by reason or other means. In this 
crusade it was the slave owners who formed the opposition. 
But before emancipation could be achieved, there was a 
still more formidable obstacle to be surmounted. This was 
the Constitution of the United States. Hence, the slavery 
controversy developed in two parallel phases. One was the 
Constitutional phase which involved arguments of a 
technical and legalistic nature, while the other was 
philosophical and moralistic in character. 
The Federal Constitution recognized the existence of 
slavery, provided for the return of fugitive "persons" who 
- 1 -
fled from one state to another, and specifically forbade any 
legislation aimed to outlaw the slave-trade prior to 1808. 
These provisions in the basic law of the Union were general­
ly accepted as an implicit denial and authority to the 
Federal Government to interfere with the institution of 
slavery within the limits of the separate states. 
However, means to effect the Constitutional provision for the 
il' return of fugitive slaves, the question of slavery in J'jthe 
il* 
( 
territories, and international slave-trade were extra­
territorial considerations which necessitated the partici­
pation of a central authority. As a result of these 
exigencies, the delicate question of slavery could not be 
avoided in the national councils. 
The initial efforts of the abolitionists at the 
outset of the Republic combined religious crusades with 
practical politics by petitioning Congress to exercise its 
Article I, Sec. 2, 9; Article IV, Sec. 2; Article V, 
Constitution of U.S., in Sanders, George P- (ed.), The 
Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamation of the United 
States of America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1863), 
Vol. I, pp. 10-21. 
2 
H.R., 1 Cong., 2 Sess., Journal (1826 ed.) 181 
March 23, 1790. For a more definitive analysis of the 
powers that the House believed the newly established govern­
ment possessed in the matter see, Arthur Bestor, ""State 
Sovereignty and Slavery," Illinois State Historical Societv. 
Vol. LIV, (Summer, 1961), pp. 122-123. 
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powers to mitigate the severity of slavery and to strive for 
its final dissolution. The first petitions presented to the 
legislature appeared in the second session of the First 
Congress in February and March, 1790. The arguments then 
presented against slavery were based on several premises: 
that it was against the law of nature, that it was incompat­
ible with the Golden Rule of Christianity, that it negated 
the Declaration of Independence, and that it was contrary 
3 
to the genius of a republican form of government. 
The great preponderance of proslavery defense revolved 
around Constitutional questions. The principal task was to 
deny the existence in Congress of any power to legislate 
against the subject of slavery. The protagonists of 
slavery, however, undertook to rebut the moral arguments 
against the institution as conveyed through the petitions. 
They argued that "the observations which have been advanced 
against the toleration of slavery" were drawn from "a mis­
guided and misinformed humanity," Biblical arguments were 
presented as evidence that slavery was not contrary to but 
Annals of the Congress of the United States 
(Washington: Printed and published by Gales and Seaton, 
1834), 1 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 244; and ibid., 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 
p. 123 9. For petitions which followed shortly thereafter, 
ibid., 2 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 241; and ibid., 2 Cong., 2 Sess., 
p. 728. 
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consistent with the laws of God. It was insisted that 
Negroes were by nature an inferior race; thus the 
Declaration of Independence did not apply to them. The 
defenders of slavery began at this time the subtle 
intimation that an entire section (the South), not^,just 
individuals, were concerned with the activities of the 
abolitionists. The proponents of slavery declared that the 
general emancipation of slaves by law would never be sub­
mitted to by the South without a civil war. They explained 
further, that the South would never have adopted the 
Constitution had it not provided some measure of security 
. . . 4 against the machinations of abolitionists. 
Despite the remonstrances of the proslavery 
Representatives in Congress, the antislavery crusaders, 
led by such distinguished men as Benjamin Franklin, 
Dr. Benjamin Rush, John Jay, and Thomas Jefferson, did 
realize a moderate degree of success in their campaign to 
put an end to slavery. Perhaps the first notable measure 
of success was the abolition of slavery within the respective 
^The defense of slavery took form in a series of 
remonstrances of Southern Representatives against the anti-
slavery memorials. See Annals of Congress, 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 
pp. 1228, 1240, 1242, 1244 (Feb., 1790); ibid., 1 Cong., 
2 Sess., pp. 1242, 1455-1460, 1463 (Mar., 1790); also ibid. , 
4 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1734. 
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limits of the Northern states. By 1799, the states of 
New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey had initiated 
5 programs for emancipation. 
Following the abolition of slavery in the Northern 
states, abolitionists turned to the task of curbing the 
operations of existing slavery wherever they found the 
means to do so. Prompted by President Jefferson in his 
0 sixth annual message (December 2, 1805), a bill to 
prohibit the slave-trade was passed and approved 
March 2, 1807, to take effect January 1, 1808. This was 
7 the earliest possible date authorized by the Constitution. 
The historian, Dwight L. Dumond, pointed out that 
reasons other than antislavery lent support to the measures 
against slave importation. Two of these reasons were, the 
desire of the slave ownersj to maintain a premium market 
value on the slaves they owned, and the fear that the slaves 
might get out of control if they became too numerous, thus 
5 Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery: The Crusade for 
Freedom in America (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 
1961), p. 27. Hereafter cited as Dumond, Antislavery Crusade. 
^Annals of Congress, 9 Cong-, 2 Sess., p. 1250. 
^U.S., Statutes at Large, II, pp. 425-430-
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placing the lives of the masters and their families in 
j eopardy.^ 
Another step Thomas Jefferson thought to be necessary 
to make the abolition of slavery more gratifying and 
realistic was the colonization of manumitted slaves "to 
faraway places."^ This idea was drawn out in the history 
of abolition by Robert C. Finley, a Presbyterian minister 
and untiring promoter of antislavery sentiment. The 
result of Finley's labor was the creation of the American 
Colonization Society.Though the society was initiated 
by antislavery sentiment, support was given for various 
and divergent reasons, most of which appeared to have come 
from other than abolition considerations. "Social Purists" 
who wished to prevent the amalgamation of free blacks with 
whites, and slave owners who saw in colonization an 
opportunity to eliminate a great source of insecurity to 
slave property, joined and worked for the organization. 
Q 
Dumond, Antislavery Crusade, p. 109. This author 
has a thorough discussion of the slave-trade debates in 
Congress. Ibid., pp. 76-86. 
^Paul Leicaster Ford (ed.). Writings of Thomas Jeffer­
son (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1892), III, p. 68. 
^^P. J. Staudernaus, The African Colonization Movement 
1816-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 20. 
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Some individuals like Francis S. Key, and certain church 
organizations supported the society for humanitarian and 
antislavery reasons. 
In its long life (1816 to approximately 1909) the 
Colonization Society experienced but a small token of 
1 ̂  success. A great deal of criticism was heaped upon the 
organization through the years from both prosiavery and 
antislavery factions. Prosiavery arguments against the 
society hinged directly on the premise that its founder 
envisioned the final dissolution of slavery through 
13 
colonization. The antislavery faction challenged the 
colonizationists' motives and described them as "self-
styed benefactors" who had arrogated the right to "decree 
14 that other men are mxserable." 
^^Ibid., pp. 28-31. 
12 . . . By the time the Civil War erupted, the Society had 
colonized over 12,000 Negroes. To do this the Society 
collected funds amounting to approximately two and a half 
million dollars. Nevertheless many of the Negroes perished 
from deprivation. Ibid., p. 248. 
^^Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 234. See 
also, William Sumner Jenkins, Prosiavery Thought in the Old 
South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1935), pp. 74-76. 
14 Staudernaus, Colonization, pp. 31-33. See also, 
Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, The Antislavery Impulse 1830-1844 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1933), pp. 28-37, 
40-45. Hereafter cited as Barnes, Antislavery Impulse. 
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From the inception of the Republic, through the 
formation of th^American Colonization Society, the 
proponents of slavery, with a few exceptions, were relative­
ly passive or apologetic in the defense of their peculiar 
institution. The antislavery attacks were annoying only 
insofar as they attempted to impugn the character of the 
Southern slave owner. Still, the crusaders represented no 
immediate danger to the continued existence of slavery 
since the institution was seemingly well-secured by the 
structure of the Constitution. | Upon the application of the 
Missouri territory for admission into the Union, however, 
things happened which caused the entire slavery controversy 
to take on new light and new vigor. 
On February 13, 1819, James Tallmadge of New York 
proposed an amendment to the bill admitting Missouri. 
This amendment, which prohibited the future introduction of 
slavery into the area, brought on an extended discussion in 
both houses of Congress concerning the duty of Congress to 
guarantee to every state a republican form of government. 
It was in this debate that the moral arguments against 
slavery were intricately blended with the argument concerning 
the powers Congress was authorized by the Constitution to 
exercise over the territories. 
- 9 -
The antislavery men in Congress wished to require 
Missouri to include a clause in her Constitution to restrict 
slavery, because it was incompatible with the republican 
form of government.The defenders of slavery on the 
other hand pointed to the clauses of the Constitution, 
which recognized slavery, and maintained that slavery was 
an element of the Constitution. 
Missouri was admitted but without reference to the 
restrictive clause on slavery, while Maine, which had in 
the meantime applied for statehood, was admitted as a 
free state. A sectional balance was thus established in 
the Union of twelve free and twelve slave states. A 
further provision of the "Compromise" was that all Federal 
territory north of latitude 36°30' was to be closed to the 
17 
extension of slavery- As the area which became Arkansas 
was the only portion of land south of this parallel left 
for organization and statehood at this time, most of the 
Louisiana territory was designated to be free soil. 
^^Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess.. pp. 1180-
1181; ibid., 15 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 128, 150, 279, 339, 
1190. 
16 
Ibid., pp. 410-413, 993, 1028; also ibid., 
16 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 51-77. 
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, III, 548. 
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The heated sectional dispute over Missouri aroused a 
positive and even aggressive approach to the defense of 
slavery. Beginning in 1820, proslavery literature became 
more prevalent and challenging. Slavery was forcefully 
pronounced as a thing good in itself with no need of 
apology for its existence. The abolitionists of the North 
were blamed for what unrest and disaffection developed in 
the institution. Both writers and statesmen in defense of 
slavery developed theories based on scripture, history, 
science, philosophy, economics, and Constitutional law to 
the end that the defense became a desire not only for the 
perpetuation of slavery but also for its extension into 
1 Q 
territories not yet annexed to the nation. 
In January 1832, the legislature of Virginia launched 
into a two-week debate on the question of continuing or 
abolishing slavery. Virginia had just experienced the 
nightmare of a slave insurrection perpetrated by Nat Turner 
at Southampton which brought death to nearly sixty of the 
18 Jenkins, Proslavery Thought, pp. 65-89. For a more 
thorough coverage on the development of proslavery theories 
and agitation see, E. N. Elliott, Cotton is King and Pro-
slavery Arguments (Augusta,Georgia; Pritchard, Abbot, and 
Loomis, 1860); see also, Eric L. McKitrick (ed.). Slavery 
Defended (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963), 
p. 85 . 
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white inhabitants. The western representatives of the state 
were practically unanimous in opposing slavery but the 
slaveholders were unwilling to give up their institution. 
By effectively defeating proposed plans for emancipation 
and colonization and pleading property rights, the slave­
holders brought Virginia to support slavery- From this 
point, the South became more solidly united in the active 
defense of the slave institution.^^ 
As if to counteract the unity of the South, the 
abolitionists in 1833 formed an organization which became 
known as the American Antislavery Society. The Society 
was formed to promote and maintain a systematic national 
abolition movement. Their demand was for immediate 
20 
emancipation. 
The Antislavery Society carried its crusade through 
such media as abolition newspapers, pamphlets, and petitions, 
together with the firebrand missionaries who sought to 
proselytize the American public to the cause against slavery. 
Many are the stories of the castigations and physical abuses 
l^Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1953), pp. 225-228. Hereafter cited as 
Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism. 
20 Barnes, Antislavery Impulse, pp. 55-56. 
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endured by antislavery zealots who struggled for a hearing.^ 
Well-known, were William Lloyd Garrison's The Liberator and 
C. W. Dennison's Emancipator. These newspapers bombarded 
the public with a constant harangue against slavery and the 
slaveholder. The Society's pamphlets evoked such a hostile 
reaction in the South that the distribution of abolition 
P3 literature was halted to that section. The flow of anti-
slavery petitions to Congress followed the suppression of 
the pamphlets- This action, in turn, provoked Southern 
Representatives to move a resolution to prohibit the reading 
24 of such material in the House. 
By 1835, the sectional division over slavery became 
more distinct and more consolidated. In their attempt to 
arrest the promulgation of abolition propaganda, the pro­
ponents of slavery gave strength to the antislavery cause 
in the North. With subtle intimations and loud protests 
21 Some of the more prominent abolition missionaries 
were Wendell Phillips, Theodore Weld, James Birney, the 
Tappan Family, and Charles G. Finney. The latter is 
credited with having organized the forces from which 
evolved the American Antislavery Society. 
22 Barnes, Antislavery Impulse, pp. 88-99. 
^ ̂Ibid., p. 61. 
24 Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism, p. 233. 
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against the South's suppressive action, the abolitionists 
persuaded the Northern public to accept the half-truth that 
the defenders of slavery stood opposed to the right of 
petition, and that slaveholders were willing to subvert the 
25 Constitution to maintain their institution of slavery-
The Colonization Society which had supporters as well as 
opponents in both sections began to lose the support of free 
Negroes in the North, as well as abolitionists who believed 
2 0 
that colonization impeded the effort for emancipation. 
The South unified in a challenging temper without 
apology. In January 1838, Senator John C. Calhoun of 
South Carolina told the Senate: "Many in the South once 
believed that it ̂ ^laver^T* was a moral and political evil; 
that folly and delusion are gone; we see it now in its 
true light, and regard it as the most safe and stable basis 
27 for free institutions in the world." Yes, the development 
25 
On May 26, 1835, John Quincy Adams, as Representa­
tive of Massachusetts, arose at role call and denounced the 
resolutions to stop the reading of antislavery petitions. 
He then sat down amidst cries of "order;" Congressional 
Debates, XII, part 4, p. 4053. 
2 ̂ 
See footnote 14 above, p. 5; see also, Dumond, 
Antislavery Crusade, p. 177. 
^^Congressional Globe, 25 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 
pp. 61-62. 
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of elaborate theories justifying slavery on the one hand, 
and the contention by antislavery groups on the other that 
the system of slavery was morally v/rong and should be 
abolished seemed to be only preliminary efforts of each side 
to influence a decision of slavery where it was most assail­
able—outside the boundaries of the slaveholding states. 
In 1845, Representative David Wilmot of Pennsylvania 
proposed a rider to an appropriation bill of two million 
dollars which was earmarked to negotiate a peace with 
Mexico. The Mexican War itself was bitterly opposed by 
the antislavery group on grounds that the war was waged to 
annex territory for the spread of slavery- The rider, a 
proviso to shut slavery out of all lands acquired as a 
result of the war, was designed to thwart the extension of 
slavery now that the acquisition of more territory was 
2ft apparent. Although the "Proviso" did not get past the 
Senate, it achieved the purpose of cutting across party 
lines and setting Southern Whigs and Democrats against 
2 9 their colleagues of the North. 
In the debate over the "Wilmot Proviso" the South 
argued two positions. In one direction, the slaveholders 
28 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 214. 
^^Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism, p. 247. 
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argued that the right of citizens to carry their insti­
tutions into the territories was not only unrestricted, but 
that the Federal Government should defend that right. In 
the other direction, the slave owners insisted that if 
restrictions were to be applied as in the 35°30' line of 
the Missouri Compromise, then the dividing line should 
merely be extended so that the establishment of a slave 
institution would be a foregone conclusion in the newly 
30 
acquired territories of the Southwest region. 
Two years later (February. 1848) the Mexican War 
ended with a treaty in which New Mexico and Upper California 
were ceded to the United States. In the North, the Free-
Soil party grew with explosive force. The Free-Soilers 
nominated former President Martin Van Buren as their 
candidate for President, and Charles Francis Adams, son of 
John Q. Adams, for Vice-President. The Free-Soil party 
platform called for "the rights of free labor against the 
aggressions of the slave power" with the slogan "Free Soil, 
Free Speech, Free Labor, Free Men." John C. Calhoun, 
Jefferson Davis, Robert B. Rhett, and others of the South 
^^Bestor, "State Sovereignty," pp. 154, 158. 
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began, openly, an attempt to organize secession of the 
31 Southern states from the Union. 
At mid-century, there were fifteen states aligned on 
each side of the slavery question, when California applied 
for admission to the Union as a free state. This was seen 
by Southerners as a threat of a permanent loss of sectional 
balance. Added to this, the growing population of the North 
was making the South a woefully impotent minority in the 
national legislature. The slaveholders were demanding Fed­
eral action against the "Personal Liberty" laws which some 
Northern states had adopted to frustrate the attempts of 
slaveholders to reclaim their runaway slaves.Proposals 
were before Congress to abolish the slave-trade in the 
District of Columbia. There were outspoken threats of 
immediate secession. In all, the Union was on the brink 
of disruption. 
31 In a letter to John J. Crittenden, Robert Toombs 
wrote, "The action of these Southern Democrats is based not 
on the conviction that Genl. T. can not settle our sec­
tional difficulties, but that he can do it. They do not wish 
it settled." Ulrich B. Phillips (ed.), "The Correspondence 
of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb," 
American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1911, Vol. II, 
p. 139. For continued efforts toward secession see, ibid., 
pp. 141-143, 145, 154, 159, 172, 178. See also Laura A. 
White, Robert Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession (New York; 
The Century Co., 1931), pp. 104, 106, 112, 115, 116, 126. 
Dumond, Antislavery Crusade, pp. 307-309. 
- 17 -
After the months of heated debate, the immediate 
threat of disunion was abated by a compromise which admitted 
California, established "popular sovereignty" to resolve the 
question of slavery in the territories, and added more 
stringent enforcement measures to the Fugitive Slave Law 
33 
of 1793. 
It was hoped that the compromise measure of 1850 had 
finally resolved the problem of slavery as it related to the 
organization of territories, but in 1854, the issue broke out 
anew. Senator Stephen Douglas, Democrat from Illinois, was 
responsible for the "popular sovereignty" doctrine which was 
used to settle the territorial dispute of 1850. As chairman 
of the Territorial Committee, he reported the bill which 
would create two organized territories (Kansas and Nebraska) 
rather than one (Nebraska) as originally suggested. As a 
further enactment, to avoid misconstruction of the question 
of slavery, "popular sovereignty" was adopted for the 
Kansas-Nebraska territories.^^ 
3 3 The foregoing account drawn primarily from: 
Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 and 2 Sess., see Index 
pp. XXXII to XXXIII. 
^"^Ibid. , 33 Cong., 1 Sess., part 1, p. 222. 
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Passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, after a long and 
heated debate, did not ease the sectional strife. The 
grounds of contention were merely shifted. William Seward, 
the Republican Senator from New York, expressed the feeling 
that the free states had lost the battle in the new territo­
rial controversy. Seward further described the outcome of 
the battle as the end of compromises and regarded the 
decision as a challenge- Since public attention had been so 
well and effectually directed toward the subject, he felt 
that slavery might be prevented from gaining a foothold in 
Kansas. "We will engage in competition for the virgin soil 
of Kansas," said Seward, "and God give the victory to the 
35 
side which is stronger in numbers as it is in right." 
Theory and talk gave way to action as a lawless struggle 
ensued to determine whether the territory of Kansas was to 
have a proslavery or antislavery Constitution- Outside of 
Kansas, however, a great national transition had begun to take 
3 6 place- In the place of two national political parties two 
sectional parties took hold. The Whig party was virtually 
^^Ibid., Appendix, p. 7 69. 
^^Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism 
1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1953), pp- 207-220. Hereafter cited as Craven, Southern 
Nationalism. 
- 19 -
destroyed with Northern Whigs aligning themselves with the 
antislavery Republican party of the North, and Southern 
Whigs joining the camp of the strong proslavery Democrats 
of the South. The Democratic party lost a great deal of its 
influence in the North by supporting the doctrine of 
"popular sovereignty" in Kansas and Nebraska, which was made 
possible by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The 
antislavery and proslavery forces thus had maneuvered their 
differences onto the political battlefield where the 
politicians secured or lost their seats according to the 
position they took on the moral question of slavery-
The Charles Sumner--Preston Brooks episode indicated 
the intensity with which each section held to its own think­
ing . The news that Brooks had cane-whipped Senator Sumner 
into unconsciousness for the slander on his kinsman gave a 
great advantage to antislavery leaders, who ignored the per­
sonal angle, and insisted Sumner had spoken for freedom, while 
at the same time denouncing the barbarism of the South. 
Brooks was heralded as a hero upon his return to South Caro­
lina, but spokesmen from other Southern states rightly stated 
that Brooks' action was unwise, and that by his rash attack 
37 
he had done more harm than good for the Southern cause. 
^ ̂Ibid., pp. 223-238. 
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The two major contenders in the Presidential election 
of 1856 were James Buchanan of Pennsylvania who ran on the 
Democratic ticket, and John C. Fremont from California on 
the newly formed Republican ticket, which party was formed 
from dissident Whigs, Democrats and Free-Soilers. The 
Democrats were straining to preserve their image as a nation­
al party, but there was no mistaking the fact that the 
Republican Party was sectional. In the Republican national 
convention no delegates from the deep South attended and 
only a few represented the border states. 
The results of the election showed Buchanan had 
carried twenty-one states with a total of 114 electoral 
38 votes. Although the Republican party lost the election, 
it scored a significant achievement for an organization 
hardly two years old. The results of the election also 
showed that the crusade against slavery had taken a giant 
step. The Republican party had become the voice of anti-
slavery sentiment ranging from the extreme abolitionists to 
the moderates. They were now a potential power that might 
soon be in a position to determine national policy, in­
cluding the maintenance or destruction of slavery. 
3 8 
Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 652. 
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In 1858, Abraham Lincoln, as a Republican candidate, 
opposed Stephen Douglas for his Senatorial post. Lincoln 
lost the election, but in the famous debates with Douglas, 
he had earned himself a prominent position in the Republican 
party. 
In 1860, Lincoln was nominated for the Presidency by 
the Republican National Convention held at Chicago, Illinois. 
The Republicans had developed a strong party organization 
with a sophisticated program designed to embrace nearly all 
the interests of the Northern segments of the nation. The 
Republican platform had planks in which they declared the 
party's support for Federal railroad building programs and 
harbor and canal improvements. They carried the preservation 
of the Union as their highest goal. The party stood opposed 
to the extension of slavery, but with Lincoln's moderation 
they hoped to allay the fears that a Republican victory 
meant a direct assault on the South or on state institutions 
39 guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The Democratic National Convention in Charleston, 
South Carolina did not nominate a candidate and the party 
Henry Steele Commager (ed.), Documents of American 
History (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 363. 
Hereafter cited as Commager, Documents. 
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split, with Douglas as standard bearer for the Northern 
Democrats and Vice-President Breckinridge as the nominee 
for the Southern Democrats. The South feared and even antici­
pated a Republican victory, but the Breckinridge supporters 
could not (or would not) follow the lead of Stephen Douglas. 
When the fact of a Republican victory was established, 
the cotton states set into motion the legislative phases 
in the drive for secession. But first they launched a 
campaign of words to justify their actions. The secessionist 
forces, following the lead of such men as William L. Yancy 
and Robert B. Rhett, had m.anipulated the precise dramatic 
event of secession. Even though the national count showed 
a strong Democratic vote in the North, that entire section 
was accused by secessionists of abolition tendencies. The 
North was accused of having perpetuated over forty years of 
continuous and increasingly intensified hostility against 
the South. The secessionists charged the North with 
flagrant disobedience of the articles of the Constitution 
and the acts of Congress designed to secure the return of 
fugitive slaves. The John Brown raid at Harper's Ferry on 
October 16, 1859, gave rise to the charge that the North had 
prompted armed insurrection. The North was further charged 
with having disrupted churches, destroyed national parties, 
- 23 -
and now finally with having organized a sectional party com-
40 
posed of men dedicated to the destruction of the South. 
Robert Barnwell Rhett, a Congressman of six terms and 
a U. S. Senator of one term, the editor of the Charleston 
Mercury, a lawyer and a churchman, and the father of twelve 
children, had dedicated his life to the one main object of 
winning secession and Southern independence. He hoped to 
build a confederacy on the cornerstone of African slavery 
and restore the African slave-trade outlawed as of 1808. 
Rhett organized "minutemen" and vigilance committees to 
make sure delegates were pledged to secession. On 
December 15, 1850, the Ordinance of Secession, written by 
Rhett, passed with the unanimous approval of 159 delegates 
41 in St. Andrew's Hall at Charleston, South Carolina. By 
February, 1851, seven states had seceded from the Union and 
formed a new alliance with each other known as the Confeder­
ate States of America. Despite the assertion of many 
Southerners that they wanted their rights in the Union and 
not secession out of it, and despite the appeals for con­
ciliation and feverish effort by many Northerners to find 
"^Qlbid. , pp. 357-372. 
41white, Rhett, pp. 5, 37-40, 133-134, 145. 
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some way of propitiating the South, the efforts of less 
than two thousand men in conventions made secession an 
accomplished fact. Under these grave conditions, Lincoln 
assumed the office of President, with the words: 
One section of our country believes slavery 
is right, and ought to be extended, while the other 
believes it is wrong, and ought not to be extended. 
This is the only substantial dispute ....^^ 
President Lincoln assessed, in his first inaugural 
address, the grave problems of slavery confronting the new 
administration. The President was cognizant of the declared 
intention of seven Southern states to be separate from the 
Union and in confederation with one another for the avowed 
43 
purpose of protecting the principles of state sovereignty-
He was also aware that the question of slavery was a primary 
4. Lincoln's Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in A 
Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pre­
pared under the direction of the Joint Committee of Printing 
of the House and Senate (New York: Bureau of National 
Literature, Inc., 1909), V, 3206-3213. Hereafter cited as 
Lincoln's Inaugural Address• 
'^^Mark M. Boatner, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: 
David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), p. 7 29. By the end of 
February, 1861, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas had declared their 
separation from the Union. On February 4, these States 
held a delegate assembly at Montgomery, Alabama, and by 
the eighth of that month they had adopted a provisional 
Constitution and elected Jefferson Davis for their President. 
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reason for their desire to secede.With regard to their 
contentions, Lincoln held that he had no intention, 
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution 
of slavery; he further beseeched the people of the land to 
exercise reason in facing the issue of slavery and appealed 
to the "better angels of their nature" to restore harmony 
A 
and affection. This did not prevent the war. 
Before the smoke cleared from the first battle, the 
status of the institution of slavery broadened from a social 
and political argument to one of direct military concern. 
On May 23, 1861, slightly over a month after the Fort Sumter 
episode, Fortress Monroe under the command of General 
Benjamin F. Butler, received three escaped Negroes. Butler 
dealt with the matter strictly as a military problem; he 
permitted the fugitive slaves to enter his camp and refused 
to restore them to their master on the grounds that they 
were being forced into hostile service against the United 
States. He later held women and children for what he termed 
"humanitarian" reasons.This action of Butler's was 
44 Commager, Documents, p. 367. 
45 • Lincoln's Inaugural Address, p. 3213. 
^^Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book (Boston: 
Thayer and Co., 1892), p. 256. 
- 26 -
neither the last word nor the cure-all for the stigma posed 
by slavery. 
Other commanders, such as General Williams at Baton 
Rouge and General Halleck in Missouri, refused to permit 
fugitive slaves to enter their army camps, and in some 
cases even went so far as to return them to their masters. 
The arguments given for this exclusion were that they were 
withholding information from the enemy, and that the 
returning of escaped slaves was a matter of making this 
47 
exclusxon effective. 
Congress, in the meantime, moved to consider some 
measures which would provide a more effective means of 
quelling the rebellion and at the same time be in the 
sphere of their declared policy of not carrying on the 
Civil War "in any spirit of oppression nor for any purposes 
of conquest or subjugation, nor for the purpose of over­
throwing or interfering with the rights or established 
"48 institutions of those states. Of their war measures, 
one of the first affecting the institution of slavery to 
any extent was the first Confiscation Act which was made 
47 J. G- Randall, Lincoln the President (New York: 
Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1945), II, p. 138. 
AO 
Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 257. 
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into law August 5, 1861. The nature of this act provided 
some discriminatory powers for the use of slaves as contra­
band of war, but at the same time, did not proclaim the 
49 slaves free. 
As the months of war continued, the judicial and 
executive departments became further involved in inter­
national, as well as domestic incidents, relating to 
slavery. The new Lincoln government ushered in the new 
policy of uncompromising suppression of the slave-trade. 
On February 21, a captain of a slave ship, Nathaniel P. 
Gordon, was hanged. Gordon was the first to be captured, 
tried, convicted, and executed for the federal offense of 
importing slaves. This action was followed by a treaty 
with England to suppress the African slave-trade negotiated 
by the State Department on May 20, and approved by Congress 
on July 11, 1862.^^ The New York Times declared with respect 
to Gordon's execution, "henceforth the Government of the 
.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 319. 
^^Warren S. Howard, American Slavery and the Federal 
Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1963), 
pp. 199-202. 
^^Helen Rex Keller, The Dictionary of Dates (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1934), II, p. 152. 
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United States washes its hands completely of all complicity 
52 in the slave-trade." 
By the time international questions on slavery had 
been properly channeled and acted upon, many further actions 
regarding slavery had been taken. On March 6, 1852, the 
President, in a special message, had appealed to Congress 
to consider compensated emancipation of slaves by co-operation 
of the Federal Government with any state which might adopt 
53 
gradual abolition. Correspondingly, the House of 
Representatives formed a Committee to study emancipation 
S a  and colonization of Negroes- In addition to this, the 
House and Senate passed a joint resolution to adopt the 
President's plan for pecuniary assistance to states exercis-
5 5 ing gradual abolition of slavery. Congress then advanced 
legislation, first to abolish slavery in the District of 
56 Columbia, and later to abolish slavery in the Territories 
^^New York Times, May 2, 1862. 
53 
Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., part 2, 
p. 1102. 
^^Ibid., p. 1112. 
^^Ibid., p. 1180. 
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 376. 
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of the United States existing at that time or thereafter, 
57 
to be formed or acquired. 
On July 17, 1862, the thirty-seventh Congress extended 
the President's war powers so as to call for militia duty. 
men between eighteen and forty-five years of age, and to 
receive qualified colored persons for military service. 
Congress also passed the Second Confiscation Act, which 
authorized the seizure of property held by rebels for the 
payment of expenses of the Federal Army, and declared free 
58 the slaves of all persons engaged in rebellion. A few 
days previous to the enactment of the Militia Act, Lincoln 
held council with two of his cabinet members. Secretary of 
State, William Seward, and Secretary of Navy, Gideon 
Welles. The subject of their discussion was the feasibility 
of emancipation of the slaves as a war measure for the 
59 
salvatxon of the Union. But, after the new slavery 
legislation was enacted, the President called a cabinet 
meeting and informed the members that he had not called them 
^^Ibid., 432. 
^^Ibid., 597-600. 
59 Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1960), I, pp. 70-71. 
Hereafter cited as Welles ' s Diary. 
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together to ask their advice as to whether he should pro­
claim emancipation, but to lay the subject matter of a 
proclamation before them. He said he would welcome their 
60 
suggestions after they heard it read. In the mam, the 
Cabinet accepted and gave their support to the President's 
Proclamation. Secretary Seward, however, considered the 
recent military set-backs and suggested postponement of the 
Proclamation's issuance "until you can give it to the 
country supported by military success 
The President did not commit himself at the meeting, 
however, he observed Seward's argument was sound and decided 
to hold the Proclamation until a significant military 
victory had been accomplished by the Federal Army. Lincoln 
later told the artist, F. B. Carpenter, that: 
The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of 
State struck me with great force. It was an 
aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon 
the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The 
result was that I put the draft of the Proclamation 
aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting 
for a victory. 
^^John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln; A 
History (New York: The Century Co., 1890), X, pp. 1-3. 
Hereafter cited as Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln: A History. 
^^Welles's Diary, p. 71. 
^^John G. Nicolay, A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln 
(New York; The Century Co., 1917), p. 332. 
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Until that success, however, Lincoln and his associates had 
a secret to keep. This at times put the President in the 
einb arras sing position of having to appear noncominittal and 
even hostile toward a policy upon which, in fact, he was 
determined. From the "immediate abolition" faction came the 
complaints of a lack of policy and Horace Greeley's "Prayer 
of Twenty Millions" published in the New York Tribune on 
August 20. To Greeley's outcry that "attempts to put down 
the Rebellion and at the same time uphold its cause were 
perposterous and futile," Lincoln replied, "My paramount 
object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not 
either to save or to destroy slavery." Beset by an anti-
slavery delegation from Chicago that urged him to issue a 
declaration against slavery. Lincoln argued "that he did not 
want to declare a policy which everyone could see would be 
ineffectual, "like the pope's bull against the comet." He 
closed the meeting with the question, "Would my word free 
the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in 
the rebel states?" The delegation departed, not knowing 
A 
Roy P. Easier (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln (New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutger's University 
Press, 1955), V, pp. 388-389. Hereafter cited as Basler, 
Works. 
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that the President had his draft for proclaiming emancipation 
64 
set aside waiting for a military victory-
In retrospect we find that the nature of the Civil War 
caused the Union government to shift, from an initial stand 
of noninterference with state institutions, toward policies 
of emancipation. As the war efforts of both sides grew to 
ghastly proportions, questions of constitutional authority 
gave way to measures on belligerent rights, contraband, con­
fiscation, and Federal compensation- The government did not 
close its eyes to popular demand or individual actions. To 
some observers it was one thing to preserve the Union and 
another thing to emancipate the slaves. To others the 
preservation of the Union and the abolition of slavery were 
coterminous with one another. 
With regard to the problems of military emancipation, 
Lincoln maintained that these were questions directly under 
h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w h i c h  h e  r e s e r v e d  f o r  h i m s e l f . T h a t  
he would not permit military commanders to force his hand 
in this matter, was amply illustrated in the early stages of 
the war. On August 30, 1861, General John C. Fremont, as 
^"^Ibid. , pp. 317-319. 
^^Ibid., p. 222. 
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Commander of the Department of the West, published a proc­
lamation establishing martial law throughout the State of 
Missouri and the slaves of rebels (proven) were to be 
declared freemen. The President, in a mild rebuke, , asked 
Fremont to tone down his proclamation and keep it within the 
limits of the Confiscation Act of August 6. Fremont said 
.  66 
he would, only if ordered to do so. He was so ordered. 
Lincoln had to again assert his authority on May 9, 1862. 
On that date. General David Hunter who was commanding the 
Department of the South, declared that "Slavery and martial 
law in a free country are altogether incompatible; the 
persons in these three states—Georgia, Florida, and South 
Carolina—heretofore held as slaves are, therefore, 
declared free forever." Upon receiving news of Hunter's act, 
Lincoln immediately issued a proclamation declaring Hunter's 
6 V order entirely unauthorized and void. The actions of 
General Fremont and General Hunter in proclaiming freedom 
for the slaves of rebel owners in their respective commands 
brought cheers and praise from the abolitionists, the press, 
and from the radicals in Congress. At the same time came 
Harry T. Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals 
(Madison; The University of Wisconsin Press, 1941), p. 40. 
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 1255. 
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the condemnation from spokesmen of the Copperheads and 
border states in Congress, together with the determination 
of combatants to refuse to do battle if the actions of 
68 
these generals were sanctioned by the President- Further, 
the possibilities of foreign intervention were imminent and 
the consideration of slavery weighed heavily. The arguments 
of the abolitionists against a slavocracy were difficult to 
advance when in fact the Federal Government demonstrated no 
strong inclination to destroy that institution. 
Regardless of the arguments the Radicals and Conser­
vatives pressed for or against an emancipation policy, the 
Chief Executive made a pact with his Maker on the outcome 
of the battle which took place at Antietam (or Sharpsburg) 
Here on September 17, 1852, Lee's attempt to thrust into the 
heart of the Union territory was checked by McClelian's 
forces. Although McClelian failed to deliver the final 
blow to the Confederacy, the battle of Antietam did give 
Lincoln the opportunity to deliver his decree of 
70 Emanc xp ation. 
^^Basler, Works, p. 222. 
Statutes at Large, XII, 1265. 
^^Welles's Diary, p. 71. 
Proclamation Issued 
Five days after the Union-Confederate encounter at 
Antietam Creek, President Lincoln issued the Preliminary 
Proclamation. Using the phrase, "Commander-in-Chief for 
the Army and Navy," he thus gave his document a military 
bearing. Lincoln reiterated his oft stated position as to 
the purpose of the war by declaring that "... hereafter, 
as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of 
practically restoring the constitutional relation between 
the United States and each state and the people thereof, in 
which states that relation is or may be suspended or 
71 dxsturbed." 
Never deviating from his sense of what was "states-
7 2 manlike, equitable, and legally sound," the President 
declared his intentions to continue his quest for Federal 
compensation to those slave states not in rebellion which 
would consider "abolishment of slavery within their 
respective limits." In addition, he would continue his 
efforts "to colonize persons of African descent with their 
7 1 . .  Emancipation Proclamation, in U.S., Statutes at 
Large, XII, 1267. 
G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln 
(New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1926), p. 365. 
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consent" wherever it was deemed practical. It should here 
be noted that although Congress had earlier made a joint 
resolution to adopt the President's plan for compensated 
emancipation in principle, the plan was never carried out. 
The main argument advanced to explain the ineffectiveness of 
this plan was that the border states were not yet willing to 
7 3 depart with the institution of slavery. 
On the question of colonization, a month prior to the 
issuance of the Preliminary Proclamation, Lincoln held an 
interview with a group of free Negroes. At this interview 
the President is reported to have stated: 
Your race suffers greatly, many of them by living 
among us, while ours suffer from your presence. 
In a word we suffer on each side. If this is 
admitted, it affords reason why we should be 
separated. If not for the institution of slavery, 
and the colored race as a basis, the war could not 
have an existence 
Despite this line of reasoning, the Proclamation contained, 
along with the idea of colonization, a desire to have the 
consent of those to be colonized. For, as might be 
suspected, not all Negroes relished the thought of being 
ostracized as an undesirable element. An interesting 
7 3 Nicolay and Hay. Lincoln: A History, V, p. 213. 
^^Basler, Works, V, pp. 371-372. 
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reflection on Lincoln's words is that of the Negro 
contemporary, Federick Douglass, who wrote: 
No, Mr. President, it is not the innocent 
horse that makes the horse thief, nor the 
traveler's purse that makes the highway robber, 
and it is not the presence of the Negro that 
causes this foul and unnatural war, but the cruel 
and brutal cupidity of those who wish to possess 
horses, money, and Negroes by means of theft, 
robbery, and rebellion. 
Regardless of any desired plans to meet the problems 
of slavery up to this point of the war, the time had come 
for action. Hence the core of Lincoln's edict wherein he 
stated his hundred day advance warning: 
That on the first day of January, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within 
any state or designated part of a state, the 
people whereof shall then be in rebellion against 
the United States, shall then be, thenceforth, 
and forever free; and the Executive Government 
of the United States, including the military and 
naval authority thereof, will recognize and main­
tain freedom of such persons, and will do no act 
or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, 
in any efforts they may make for their actual 
freedom. 
The Chief Executive then went on to designate his 
course of action as one of executing the already formulated 
75 Phillip S. Foner, The Life and Writings of Frederick 
Douglass (New York: International, 1952), p. 25. 
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 1267, 
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laws of a duly elected Congress. He called attention first 
to an act of Congress approved March 13, 1862, entitled, 
"An act to make an additional article of war," which prohib­
ited the return of fugitives by the military or naval 
personnel; and second, to Section;^9 and 10 of the 
"Confiscation Act" approved July 17, 1852, which declared 
slaves of rebels coming into Union hands as free, not to 
be delivered up under any pretense by military or naval 
persons as of that date. 
The edict, which showed no hostility toward the 
slaveholders, closed with a promise that: 
The Executive will in due time recommend 
that all citizens of the United States who 
shall have remained loyal thereto throughout 
the rebellion shall (upon restoration of the 
constitutional relation between the United 
States and their respective states and people, 
if that relation shall have been suspended or 
disturbed) be compensated for all losses by 
acts of the United States, including the loss 
7 7 of siaves. 
One hundred days later, January 1, 1853, the second 
and definitive edict was issued, without which the first 
would have had no significance. 
The preamble of this decree referred to the earlier 
proclamation of warning and then declared the emancipation 
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 1267. 
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of slaves in areas designated as in rebellion. The areas 
listed included the ten states of Arkansas, Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia. Thirteen parishes 
of Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans, the forty-
eight counties which were designated West Virginia, plus 
five other counties of Virginia, were marked out as not to 
be effected by the Proclamation. 
The President then enjoined those declared free to 
eschew violence and the use of it whenever possible and to 
work faithfully for wages if afforded the opportunity. 
Further he declared all qualified persons so emancipated 
"... will be received into the armed services of the United 
States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other 
places, and to man vessels of all sorts." He then closed 
with "and upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of 
justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military 
necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, 
78 and the gracious favor of Almighty God." The final 
Proclamation of Emancipation thus left the impression that 
the President struggled with Constitutional problems. 
"^Qlbid. , pp. 1268-1269. 
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invoked his decreee as a military necessity, and left 
to rest on the will of Providence. 
CHAPTER II 
NORTHERN REACTIONS 
The composition of President Lincoln's cabinet 
consisted of men who, as a body of advisers, represented a 
wide range of public opinion in the North.^ Three of the 
members of the cabinet. Secretary of State William F. Seward 
of New York, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P- Chase of 
Ohio, and Attorney General Edward Bates of Missouri, were 
strong contenders for the top executive position in the 
Republican convention in 1860. Each of the three men 
commanded noteworthy support as presidential aspirants. 
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair was a man who represent­
ed, through himself and his relatives, the important 
opinions of the border states. Secretary of Interior 
Caleb B. Smith, although not a man of commanding influence, 
represented the more conservative opinions of the Republican 
party- Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, an old-line 
^As stated here. North refers to the fifteen free 
states and the four slave states of the border, Kentucky, 
Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, that remained loyal to the 
Union. 
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Whig who as a Republican candidate had made an unsuccessful 
bid for the governorship of Connecticut in 1855, represented 
the moderate faction of the anti slavery forces. All of 
the members of the Cabinet served as two-fold barometers of 
opinion. As important political leaders their views were of 
prime importance, and because they were closely attuned to 
local ideas, they reflected the opinions of their areas 
toward President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. 
From the time he read the first draft of a 
proclamation to the cabinet in July, to September 22, when 
he brought the subject up again, Lincoln had thought deeply 
about the subject of emancipation. Consequently, the 
phrasing of his proclamation was considerably altered by 
3 
September. In the cabinet meeting on September 22, the 
President repeated his previous statement that he was not 
asking the advice of the members as to whether or not he 
2 Harry T. Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941), p. 19; 
William B. Hesseltine (ed.). Three Against Lincoln (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), pp. 167-169, 
Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the 
War Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1954) , 
pp. 216-219. Hereafter cited as Sandburg, Lincoln: Prairie 
and War Years. 
^Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1955), II, 55. Hereafter cited as Lincoln: Collected 
Works. 
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should proclaim emancipation, for he had already decided on 
that. The President did, however, want to hear the cabinet 
members' comments (for or against), and any constructive 
criticism they had to offer on the way the Proclaimation 
4 
should be phrased. 
After he had read the Proclamation, Lincoln called 
for discussion on the matter- Secretary of State Seward 
responded by noting that the question had already been 
decided. Yet, the Secretary of State also felt that the 
President's decree should be more decisive and convey the 
feeling that the policy would be far more lasting than 
the term of the Lincoln administration. Seward urged that 
the decree should "not merely say the government recognizes, 
but that it will maintain the freedom it proclaims." The 
5 
cabinet concurred and it was so adopted. Seward also 
suggested that if any persons of African descent were 
colonized, such action should take place only with the consent 
of those to be colonized and after agreement had been 
reached with the governments in those parts of the world 
^Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles (New 
York; W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950), p. 71. Hereafter 
cited as Welles's Diary. 
^Henry Steele Commager (ed.), The Blue and the Gray 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1950), p. 1088. Here­
after cited as Coiranager, Blue and Gray• 
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considered for colonization.^ This proposal was also 
adopted, but not with the unanimous approval of the Cabinet. 
On the matter of colonization. President Lincoln held that 
it was essential to provide asylum for a race "we had 
emancipated but which could never be recognized or admitted 
to be our equals."^ 
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, Jr., member of 
the Blair family of Maryland which commanded a great deal of 
political influence in the border states, was also greatly 
interested in some plan of deportation, but he did not offer 
a matured plan for carrying out such a program. Attorney 
General Edward Bates disagreed with Secretary Seward's 
amendment which required the consent of the potential 
deportees. He recommended compulsory deportation, because 
the Negroes had great local attachments and would not go 
Q 
voluntarily- President Lincoln objected to compulsory 
deportation, thus it was overruled. 
Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, regarded 
the President's Proclamation as satisfactory. Prior to the 
^Ibid. 
^Welles's Diary, p. 52. 
®Ibid. 
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meeting. Chase had suggested that emancipation could be much 
more effectively and quietly effected by allowing the army 
commanders in the field to organize and arm the slaves, and 
9 
pronounce emancipation within their commands. Nevertheless, 
he stated that Lincoln had given to every proposition which 
had been made, a "kind and candid consideration," and that 
the Chief Executive's conclusion had been arrived at "clearly 
and distinctly," Although the Secretary pointed out that 
the Proclamation did not "mark out the course" he preferred, 
he would give it his full support. 
Postmaster Blair went into a prolonged discourse 
expressing his views on emancipation and his reasons for 
objecting to the measure at that time. In the main, he had 
no objection to the principle of emancipation. He said he 
was always ready to emancipate "rather than submit to the 
perpetuation of the system." But Blair also felt that the 
edict placed in jeopardy the loyalty of the patriotic element 
in the border states. The Postmaster, a political organizer 
in Maryland, felt that the patriotism of the border area 
had been severely tried and that this Proclamation would, as 
^Thomas G. Beldon and Marve R. Belden, So Fell the 
Angels (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1955), p. 57. 
^^Commager, Blue and Gray, p. 1088. 
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soon as it reached them, be likely to carry over those 
States to the secessionists. He further cautioned that 
the emancipation policy could be used to advantage by the 
opposition parties to defeat the administration in the 
coming elections.The President expressed his apprehen­
sion as to the danger of losing the votes and possibly a 
portion of the army from the border states, but the Post­
master General's argument concerning the opposition parties 
was obvious and Lincoln did not acknowledge it with any 
special concern. Mr. Blair asked that his paper stating his 
objections be filed with the Proclamation as it was to be 
1 9 xssued."^'' Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, sat and 
13 listened but offered no comment. 
Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, wrote of the 
Emancipation Proclamation: 
It is momentous both in its immediate and remote 
results, and an exercise of extraordinary power, 
which cannot be justified on mere humanitarian 
principles _^uch use of Federal powers/' would never 
^^John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A 
History (New York: The Century Co., 1890), VI, 163. 
Hereafter cited as Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln: History. 
^^Welles ' s Diary, p. 144. 
13 Benjamin P- Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: 
The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: 
Alfred A. Knoff, 1962), p. 246. Hereafter cited as Thomas 
and Hyman, Stanton. 
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have been attempted but to preserve the national 
existence. The slaves must be with us or against 
us in the war. Let us have them. These were my 
convictions ̂ ^^uring the Cabinet meetin^y this 
was the drift of the discussion. 
After the Proclamation had been fully discussed by 
the President and his Cabinet, and the suggested alterations 
had been made, a plan for future proceedings to effect the 
intended policy had to be established. The first step was 
to place the decree before public leaders to observe their 
reactions. As an initial gesture, a group of citizens from 
the Washington area came to the White House with a brass 
band and expressed its appreciation and support to the 
President for his act of emancipation. Lincoln told the 
group that he had done what he thought was right in the 
face of the problems and hardships before him, which he 
said were nowhere near as difficult as were those upon the 
battlefield. He could only hope he had made no mistake. 
The crowd cheered and sang, the band played, and then the 
group of citizens made its way to the home of Secretary 
Chase who was in the company of the colorful statesman from 
Kentucky, Cassius M. Clay, and Lincoln's private secretary, 
John Hay. Chase and Clay made speeches to the people 
^^Welles's Diary, p. 144. 
^^Lincoln: Collected Works, VIII, 254. 
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expressing their pleasure at the momentous declaration. 
Pleasantries were exchanged and the serenaders then went to 
the residence of Mr. Bates to hear more about the 
emancipation plan.^^ Bates disappointed them, however, by 
telling them it was not his place to comment on a statement 
1 7 of policy which emanated from one of a higher station. 
Hay remained at the Chase mansion after the serenaders 
had departed and took note of the conversations among the 
"old fogies" who stayed at the mansion and drank wine. 
Chase spoke seriously of the Proclamation and referred to 
the secession movement as a serious mistake on the part of 
the slaveholders. The Secretary of the Treasury believed 
that the President's edict would prove to be the death blow 
to "slavocracy." He maintained that the institution of 
slavery might have continued in existence for a long time 
had the South remained in the Union. Mr. Chase's argument 
was that neither the Republican party nor any antislavery 
sentiment of the North, prior to the rebellion, ever could 
have destroyed slavery- But by divorcing themselves from 
^^Courtlandt Canby (ed.), Lincoln and the Civil War 
(New York; George Braziller, Inc., 1960), p. 288. 
^^John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation 
(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), p. 60-
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the Union and its Constitution, the Southern leaders had 
placed their once protected institution in the "very path 
of destruction." According to John Hay, Chase's guests 
agreed and they all seemed to become relaxed, as if the 
weight of slavery had been lifted from their shoulders. 
They referred to each other and themselves as abolitionists, 
and everyone seemed to enjoy the appellation with the 
exception of Hay, who referred to abolitionist as "that 
18 horrible name." 
The attitude of Chase and his friends, as portrayed 
by Hay, was not universal in official circles. Lincoln, 
himself, only one week after the issuance of his Procla­
mation, wrote an apprehensive note to the Vice-President, 
Hannibal Hamlin. Lincoln explained to Hamlin that the 
South would feel the effect of the decree in time, but he 
said that he had hoped for a more favorable response from 
the North. The President appreciated the support given by 
the newspapers and the commendations of distinguished 
individuals, but he watched nervously as the stock market 
showed a decline and fewer volunteers came into the army. 
Lincoln's head was not turned by praise when he saw the 
18 Tyler Dennett (ed.), Lincoln and the Civil War in 
the Diary and Letters of John Hay (New York: Dodd & Mead 
Co., 1939), p. 50. 
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economic and military campaigns continuing to falter even 
after the promulgation of his Proclamation.^^ 
Within the same week, other groups called on the 
President to pledge support for his Proclamation, and, in 
at least one instance, to demonstrate Union-wide acceptance 
of this policy. In a manner, they appear to have been 
expressing a fear lest the convictions of the President 
should wane and the intent of the preliminary proclamation 
not be carried out. One group, a committee representing 
the Congregational Churches of New York, led by the 
abolitionist Reverend Henry Ward Beecher, editor of the 
Independent, and leading critic of Lincoln's non-inter-
ference policy, insisted that emancipation was the right 
course of action to use against the secessionists. Then 
Beecher presented Lincoln with a set of resolutions which 
declared unqualified endorsement of the President's 
20 actxon. Perhaps more concrete backing was given by a 
delegation of governors who urged Lincoln to pursue his 
newly declared course with courage. Sixteen of the twenty-
^^John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: 
Complete Works (New York: The Century Co. 1907), II, 242. 
Hereafter cited as Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln; Works. 
^Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 60. 
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one governors who attended a conference at Altoona, Pennsyl­
vania, "to take measures for the more active support of the 
government" endorsed the Emancipation Proclamation. The 
remaining five governors pledged support for the Union, but 
emancipation was yet a subject too extreme for their 
constituencies. Governor Bradford of Maryland told the 
conference if he were to sign the resolutions he would be a 
ruined man. Apparently governors of Kentucky, Missouri, and 
New Jersey interpreted the opinions of their states in the 
same way. 
To a certain extent the governors' delegation to 
Washington was a staged performance. Governor Curtain of 
Pennsylvania and Governor Andrew of Massachusetts collabo­
rated to draw the loyal governors into a conference for the 
purpose of taking united action toward giving the war a 
definite aim. Andrew and Curtain, however, had spoken to 
Lincoln of their actions beforehand. The President told 
them of his prepared proclamation and said if they wished 
he would withhold it until they presented him with a 
formal request to act. The governors felt that the President 
21carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln; The Prairie Years 
and the War Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 
1954), p. 320. 
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should issue the Proclamation; they would then give it 
p p 
a strong endorsement. 
The legislators from the border states had negated 
several provisions similar to those in the Emancipation 
Proclamation. In March 1862, President Lincoln had called 
a conference of the congressmen from the border states to 
consider a plan for compensated emancipation, which to 
Lincoln's mind, had strong possibilities for the shortening 
23 of the war. The results of the conference were dis­
appointing to Lincoln. The border states took offense at 
this approach; they were not willing to admit that their 
institution of slavery would be extinguished by the war as 
P4. Lincoln had said, and they jealously guarded their 
Constitutional right to maintain the institution sanctioned 
25 by their own state government. The representatives of the 
border states in the National Congress argued in vain against 
the drastic Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862. Through that 
22 
Allen Nevins, The War for the Union (New York: 
Charles Scribners & Sons, 1960), II, 239-240. Hereafter 
cited as Nevin, War for the Union. 
23Lincoln; Collected Works, V, 160. 
94. 
Lincoln: Collected Works, V, pp. 317-319. 
2^Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln; A History, V, 213. 
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measure, the only way a slaveholder could reclaim his 
runaway slave was by pledging his loyalty to the Union-
This not only created hardships for the loyal slaveholders, 
but also caused them to question the value of this loyalty 
to the Union. It was therefore not surprising that the 
governors of the border states should refuse to endorse the 
President's edict. 
Although the refusal of the governors from the border 
states to endorse the Proclamation was disappointing to the 
President, he was even more disappointed by the reactions 
of his appointee, Edward Stanley, the Military Governor of 
North Carolina. Mr. Stanley expressed his astonishment at 
the Proclamation and declared that the edict was a 
perfidious act. The Military Governor could not condone 
the President's act against slavery and offered his 
resignation. Before abandoning his post. Governor Stanley 
had several audiences with Lincoln in which the President 
tried to explain the circumstances surrounding the matter. 
The President reportedly told Stanley he believed, "That, 
without the proclamation for which they had been clamoring, 
the Radicals would have taken the extreme step in Congress 
of withholding supplies for carrying on the war--leaving 
- 54 -
the whole land in anarchy." Stanley remained at his 
^ 26 post. 
Certain questions probably cannot be answered with 
positive assurance. For example, it is not known definitely 
whether President Lincoln delayed the issuance of the 
Proclamation because of his Secretary of State's advice 
or in order to allay possible agitation from the border 
states and conservative Republicans. Moreover, it can only 
be conjectured whether he issued the emancipatory decree 
because the pressures of the hard-core abolitionists became 
too weighty, or because of his alledged promise to God to 
offer emancipation if saved from a military defeat at 
Antietam. However, as the President announced his policy 
on slavery in the Fall of an election year, he had an 
opportunity to ascertain objectively the popular response 
to the issue throughout the Union on the basis of the 
election results. 
It is true that the opponents of Lincoln and his 
supporters in Congress had more than the question of the 
status of slavery to put before the public. Issues ranged 
26Allen Thorndike Rice, Reminiscences of Abraham 
Lincoln (New York: North American Review, 1885), pp. 532-533; 
Hereafter cited as Rice, Reminiscences of Lincoln; Thomas 
and Hyman, Stanton, p. 307. 
- 55 -
from the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for those 
resisting the draft through such political blundering in 
27 military affairs as McClellan's "slows." Although 
Lincoln was aware of the public's dissatisfaction with 
military failures and the existence of the heavy hand of 
military law in the civilian communities, he was anxious 
to know the disposition of Union supporters toward his 
Emancipation Proclamation. In a directive to General U. S. 
Grant, commanding in the Tennessee theatre, Lincoln asked 
the General to take possible steps to give the people there 
a chance to express their feelings at the elections. The 
President cautioned the General to follow the forms of the 
law as far as convenient, but to get the expression of the 
largest possible number of people, and to ascertain how the 
election results would connect with and affect the 
28 
proclamation of September 22. 
The President followed the course of the political 
campaign throughout the country but especially in his home 
state of Illinois. David Davis, a circuit judge, and 
Lincoln's foremost campaign manager of the 1860 campaign 
^^Nevins, War for the Union, II, 323-324. 
op 
Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939), III, 610. 
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kept the President posted on the political developments there. 
In his home district, Lincoln's two friends, John T. Stuart 
and Leonard Swett, were opposing one another. The Democrats 
nominated his old law-partner, Stuart, while Swett, who had 
campaigned vigorously for Lincoln in the presidential 
nominating convention in Chicago, was endorsed by the 
Republicans. Stuart argued that Lincoln had transgressed 
the Constitution by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, 
but he was non-committal on the Proclamation, while Swett 
carried on the emancipation crusade in his campaign. At 
the outset, Davis reported that the Proclamation seemed to 
have been well received, Swett had endorsed it and people 
were uniting in the belief that it was the duty of the 
Federal Government to launch an overwhelming attack upon 
29 
the rebels if they refused to give up the rebellion. 
As the political campaign gained momentum, the 
disposition toward emancipation in many states changed 
from a favorable attitude to one of resentment and 
antagonism toward those who endorsed it, and in many cases 
may have caused their defeat. Unwittingly. Secretary of 
^^Willard L. King, Lincoln's Manager David Davis 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1960), p. 198. Hereafter cited as King, David Davis. 
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War, Stanton, gave substance to the Democratic charges 
against the Republican administration- The Secretary ordered 
the Negroes who were sent to the Army post at Cairo, Illinois, 
colonized, and urged the white leaders of the state to make 
a special effort to find temporary jobs for them. The 
Constitution of Illinois forbade the entrance of Negroes 
into that state, and as a result of Stanton's actions, even 
War Democrats (those loyal to the cause for the Union but 
opposed to Republican doctrine) considered their civil 
liberties threatened. The order was countermanded but too 
late to stop the vitriolic attacks from being disseminated 
throughout the land.^*^ The slogan of the Democrats in the 
election was "The Constitution as it is and the Union as 
31 it was," but the general theme in the campaign from New 
York to Iowa was, "Every white laboring man in the North 
who does not want to be swapped off for a free nigger ̂ /sic/ 
32 should vote the Democratic ticket." 
Other states had laws and constitutional restrictions 
which prohibited the immigration of free Negroes and mulattoes. 
'^Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, p. 248. 
O 1 
King, David Davis, p- 198. 
^^Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 84. 
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In regard to these legal restrictions, it was argued that 
if the war measures on slavery could cause military disregard 
for Illinois law, then "emancipation would inundate" other 
33 states with free Negroes. In his reports to Lincoln, 
David Davis noted the change from wide acceptance to general 
34 dissatisfaction with the idea of emancipation. The 
President saw his own congressional district go to the 
Democrat, Stuart. In the country at large, the Democrats 
carried Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 
Horatio Seymour, who was fiercely hostile to attacks on 
slavery, the Confiscation law, and the draft, achieved a 
sweeping victory for the Democrats by gaining New York's 
top executive position. 
Those candidates who upheld the Emancipation 
Proclamation in the election generally argued that it was 
good military strategy, and that it would bring victory with 
freedom in its wake. Along with these arguments, the 
Republicans attempted to brand the opposition party as 
33 Edward Younger, John A. Kasson (Iowa City, Iowa: 
State Historical Society of Iowa, 1955), p. 137. 
34 
King, David Davis, p. 199. 
O C 
Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, p. 249. 
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disloyal because of its criticism of the wartime 
administration. 
The party associated with Lincoln maintained a slim 
majority in Congress. Antislavery candidates in New England 
and the proslavery border states were retained. The votes 
of Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Oregon, and California 
likewise gave a vote of confidence to their representatives. 
Although the Republican majority was reduced in the 186 2 
election, it still retained control of the House by a ratio 
of 101 to 81.^^ 
The Northern press analyzed the relationship of the 
Emancipation Proclamation to the election in three major 
ways. One concludes that factors other than the 
Proclamation were most prominent in influencing the voters. 
Another analysis supported the idea that the Proclamation 
placed the Republicans at a disadvantage, because of the 
absence at the polls of antislavery partisans who were at 
war. As an example of the first analysis, the New York 
Times underscored the "want of confidence" as the cause for 
the Republican setback, and indicated that the administration 
^^Younger, Kasson, p. 137; Franklin, Emancipation 
Proclamation, p. 84-85. 
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 5. 
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heads should have put pressure on the President to move more 
decisively and vigorously to close the war. The Times made 
it a point to state that the President's patriotism was 
beyond reproach, but it insisted that Lincoln lacked the 
determination that is "inspired by the consciousness of 
infinite interests at stake" to prosecute the war effectively. 
The Times made no reference to the Emancipation Proclamation 
38 
as a cause for the setback. The New York Tribune supported 
the second analysis in its attack on the conservative 
element in which the Tribune editor, Horace Greeley, saw 
the Proclamation as a reason for the setback because of the 
absence at war of thousands of ardent Republicans while 
"every partisan of slavery, every sympathizer with the 
rebellion, and every coward who feared the drafts" was 
39 available at the polls. The New York Herald exemplified 
the third position in its explanation that the election 
results were the voters' notice to Lincoln that they (the 
voters) were supporting the war for the restoration of the 
Union and not the"bloody extermination of slavery."^® 
^®New York Times, Nov. 7, 1862. 
39 New York Tribune, Nov. 7, 1852. 
"^Ocited in Sandburg, Lincoln; War Years, III, p. 610. 
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Lincoln studied the election results very carefully 
and agreed in part with the Tribune's interpretation. He 
thought that the Democratic victories were partly owing to 
the absence of many Republicans who were taking part in the 
war effort. He also believed that Democratic leaders had 
made an all out effort to secure control of Congress. The 
President blamed the part of the Republican press, which 
by "villifying and disparaging" attacks against the 
administration, had given the Democrats lethal weapons 
with which to assail the Republicans. Lincoln also thought 
that the people had become depressed by the ill success of 
the war and thus were susceptible to anti-admdLnistration 
propaganda. The President did not believe, or at least he 
did not express the belief that his Emancipation Proclamation 
41 
was a cause for the political reverses which took place. 
The reports the President received from re-elected 
Congressmen, and messages from Republican candidates during 
his campaign, more frequently reflected anxiety over military 
matters than apprehension concerning the emancipation 
42 edict. In addition, in the states of Iowa, Kansas, and 
^^Lincoln; Collected Works, V, 493-495. 
'^^New York Times, Nov. 5, 1852. 
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Missouri, where emancipation was the major campaign issue, 
43 
the Republicans were victorious. That the public voted 
against the administration because of military defeats and 
a hesitancy to press the enemy, was demonstrated to the 
President by a report he received from J. K. Moorehead, 
a re-elected Representative from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-
Moorehead was in agreement with his constituency that 
General McClellan, who was severely criticized for not 
having followed through with the Antietam campaign in an 
attempt to crush the Confederate army, had been placated 
too long by President Lincoln. The Pennsylvanian 
Representative told of his constituents' chagrin over 
Lincoln's support for McClellan and declared that some of 
the voters would be glad to hear that the President "had 
been found hanging from the post of a lamp at the door of 
the White House." Mr. Lincoln said if it happened, he 
would not be surprised. He realized that his recent behavior 
"must be incomprehensible" to some people, but it could not 
"now be explained." The President felt that he was being 
made the target of slander and invective not because of his 
own war measures, but because of the support he had given 
^^Nevins, War for the Union, II, 320. 
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44 to seemingly incompetent military leaders. 
Aside from keeping abreast of the campaigns and 
elections, the President, Cabinet, and Congressional leaders 
were occupied with working out the details associated with 
emancipation so that the program might be carried out in 
accordance with the concepts proclaimed on September 22, 
i.e., compensation and colonization. A week after the 
preliminary proclamation was issued, the cabinet met to 
discuss the matter of colonization. The President had 
already expressed his firm opposition to Attorney General 
Bates's suggestion of compulsory deportation, but at the 
September 29 meeting. Bates read a paper which he had 
carefully prepared in order to give a clear expression of 
his views. The Attorney General outlined the need for an 
executive contract with the government of those countries 
where freed Negroes might be colonized. President Lincoln 
was not satisfied with the idea of a contract and pointed out 
the need for a treaty that would give those colonized a 
guarantee of citizenship in the nations where they were 
45 relocated. 
^^Sandburg, Lincoln: War Years, III, 505-507. 
^^Welles's Diary, I, 153. That Lincoln wanted to 
insure would-be colonists the rights of citizenship was 
attested in his Annual Message to Congress in December, 1852. 
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46 
Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Smith, stated that 
the Senate would never ratify a treaty conferring any power 
over an American enterprise, and advised that Seward should 
47 make a contract. Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy from Kansas 
espoused with great zeal a scheme to colonize Negroes in 
Chiriqui, Panama, where supposedly large quantities of coal 
could be mined for the use of the Navy.'^® A sum of 
$600,000 had been voted to Congress earlier in the year 
49 for the purpose of locating emancipated Negroes. The 
President had earlier given his Secretary of the Navy, 
Gideon Welles, the maps, reports, titles and evidence 
having to do with the Chiriqui land grants. Welles was 
instructed to make the decision of whether or not the 
Navy Department should contract to buy the coal to be mined 
there by colonized free Negroes. The Secretary spent 
several days studying the data and decided there was "fraud" 
^^Smith had not forgiven Lincoln for refusing to con­
sult the Cabinet on the decision to issue the Proclamation; 
but had sought advice only on matters of form. King, David 
Davis, p. 284. 
A n  
Welles's Diary, I, 153. 
^^Welles's Diary, I, 156. 
49 
U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 378, 582. (Approved 
Apr. 16, 1862, for $100,000. Approved July 16, 1862, for 
$500,000)-
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C Q 
in the affair. ^ Secretary Smith, under orders from Presi­
dent Lincoln, also studied colonization projects. Smith 
warmly endorsed the Chiriqui settlement scheme, and outlined 
the particulars of an arrangement he had made with the 
51 American-owned Chiriqui Improvement Company. Welles 
described Smith's report as "skillful" and one that dealt 
with both coal and Negroes. Nonetheless he refused to 
52 adopt Secretary Smith's views. Subsequently Central 
American ministers protested that the United States govern­
ment was preparing to intrude into their territories, create 
alien colonies, and defy the sovereignty of the Central 
53 
American Republics- The legality of the Chiriqui grant 
was also challenged by the ministers. The plan was 
abandoned but the initial question of colonization remained 
for further study-
Although the process of emancipation was not to begin 
until the states or parts of states in rebellion had been 
^^Welles's Diary, I, 156. 
SI . . P. J. Staudenaus, The African Colonization Movement 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 247. 
Hereafter cited as Staudenaus, Colonization. 
52ibid., p. 248. 
53 
Welles's Diary. I, 151; Rice, p. 61. 
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designated, or until the hundred-day warning period had been 
exhausted, efforts were made to inform the men and officers 
of the Army and Navy of the President's decree on 
emancipation. Fifteen thousand copies of the President's 
Proclamation were distributed as General Order 139 to the 
54 commanders in the field. 
The reactions of the troops were so varied and con­
flicting that no generalization of their attitude toward 
the emancipation policy can be firmly established as 
indicative of universal acceptance or rejection of it. 
Some of the men and officers whole-heartedly endorsed the 
Proclamation with hopes that the war would now be prosecuted 
more vigorously. Some of the soldiers became depressed 
and expressed grave disappointment, while still others 
denounced the war measure with bitterness to the extent 
55 
that some officers resigned and returned to their homes-
For General McClellan, who had recently been credited 
with checking the Confederate thrust into Maryland, the 
Proclamation caused a great deal of consternation. The 
General's first reactions were violent and unreasoned; he 
^^Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 79. 
^^Ibid., pp. 79-80; Nevins, II, 238-239. 
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called the President's edict an outrage and threatened to 
submit his resignation, but this was in the privacy of his 
56 headquarters and with few witnesses. The General was 
aware of his duties as a soldier but he was also aware that 
Democrats spoke of him as their next Presidential nominee. 
Before issuing a statement to his men regarding the 
Proclamation, therefore, McClellan sought matured advice. 
In a letter to the New York millionaire, William H. 
Aspinwall, who dabbled in politics, McClellan stated that 
he was very anxious to learn how men like Aspinwall regarded 
the President's decree which he (McClellan) thought would 
57 inaugurate servile war. The General also held a confer­
ence with a few of his officers wherein he explained his 
political position and informed them he had been advised to 
openly oppose the Proclamation. He asked them for their 
views on the matter. His officers warned him that the 
Army would not support the flaunting of civil authority 
and further that he was "skirting on the edge of treason as 
CO 
well." Aspinwall went to McClellan's camp where he 
Sandburg, Lincoln: Prairie Years and War Years, 
p. 3 26. 
57 
Nevins, II, 238. 
CO 
Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p- 171. 
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counseled the presidential aspirant "to go along with 
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, say nothing, and be 
c q 
a good soldier.' Following that advice, McClellan decided 
to issue a short statement to the soldiers, explaining that, 
whatever private feelings they might have, they were bound 
as soldiers to support the orders from the government.^® 
In a later order. General McClellan warned against discussion 
of public measures on the grounds that such a pursuit 
"impaired and destroyed discipline and efficiency. 
Then in a letter to his wife, after pointing out his 
superiority socially, morally, and intellectually over 
certain heads of government to whom "the good of the country 
required him to submit," the General vented his anguish with 
the assertion that "there never was a truer epithet applied 
to a certain individual than that of 'Gorilla'. 
The soldiers' feelings were not complicated by 
political ambition, as were those of General McClellan. 
Samples of their letters and diaries indicate that few of 
59 Sandburg, Lincoln: Prairie Years and War Years, 
p. 327. 
60 
Catton, Hallowed Ground, p. 171. 
^^Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 79. 
6 2 
Sandburg, Lincoln: Prairie Years and War Years, 
p. 3 27. 
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the fighting men intrinsically supported the Emancipation 
Proclamation. Some of the soldiers gave qualified support 
to the edict, while there were those who were flatly opposed 
to it. Most of the soldiers felt their main reason for 
serving in the Union Army was to save the Union. However, 
reports from high ranking officers indicated that a majority 
of the Northern soldiers indirectly approved of the 
Proclamation because it signified a more aggressive pursuit 
of the enemy-
Some troops were more concerned with the liberating 
aspect of Lincoln's decree than with his provision to solve 
6 3 the race problem by colonization. Even with his doubts 
that the Proclamation would be duly carried out, one soldier 
wrote home, "I do not intend to shirk, now there is really 
something to fight for. I mean freedom. 1 do not expect 
any great success at present, but so long as I am convinced 
that we are on the right side I trust no failure will dis­
hearten me."^^ Others accepted the implications of the 
Proclamation and relied upon the proposal to colonize the 
freedmen. A colonization program was looked upon as a means 
^^Nevins, War for the Union, II, 239. 
^"^Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1951), p. 41. 
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of relieving the apprehensions of the Northern states who 
65 were fearful of a Negro inundation of their areas. An 
Illinois soldier praised the Emancipation Proclamation, but 
he commented "that it would be a mistake to permit freed 
Negroes to mingle with the Whites. The soldier was confident 
however, that "Old Abe" would "send them off and colonize 
them." The Illinois soldier explained that preparations 
were being made and all could be assured that colonization 
would be put into effect.^^ Some of the soldiers may have 
supported the Proclamation because they saw a possibility 
that commissions would be issued to men who took command of 
units of Negro troops. 
Officers who observed the reactions of their men 
toward the new emancipation policy reported general approval. 
The approval expressed, however, was not so much from 
humanitarian motives on the part of the soldiers as it was 
a feeling that the edict might initiate a more aggressive 
prosecution of the war. A letter from Colonel W. H. Blake 
to Speaker of the House, Schuler Colfax, provided a closer 
^^Nevins, War for the Union, II, p. 307. 
^^Wiley, Billy Yank, p. 112. 
^^Nevins, War for the Union, II, p- 307. 
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estimate of the general attitude of army personnel toward 
the Emancipation Proclamation. The Colonel showed no 
sympathy for the abolitionists, yet he saw that emancipation 
might serve a useful military purpose. He saw "a desire to 
destroy everything that in aught gives the rebels strength," 
and he believed there was a universal desire among the 
soldiers to take the Negro from the "secesh" master. "This 
army," wrote Blake, "will sustain the emancipation 
proclamation and enforce it with the bayonet."^® 
Discontent that verged on disloyalty was expressed 
by soldiers who were chagrined with the thought of having 
to live in the same community with free Negroes. "As soon 
as i ̂ sic/ get my money," said a bedridden soldier," i 
am coming home it be deserting or not, but if 
they don't quit freeing the niggers and putting them 
in the north /_ ,_/ i won't go back ̂ to the arm^/ any more."^^ 
The argument that the war was for the restoration of the 
Union and not to abolish slavery was conveyed by other 
troops in their letters. A self-appointed spokesman for the 
Army related that the disposition of the men in the Army was 
Ibid., p. 239. 
^^Wiley, Billy Yank, p. 112. 
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against emancipation. "They do not wish to think they are 
fighting for Negroes," he said, "But to put down the 
Rebellion." An Ohioan with brevity and less refinement 
maintained that the soldiers had no affection for the Negro 
or anyone who sympathized with them. As far as he was 
concerned both were malignant infestations of society.^® 
For General Ulysses S. Grant, the sword was to be 
used to restore the Union. If possible Southern rights 
should be preserved, but he was determined that if the 
rebellion could not "be whipped in any other way than 
71 through a war on slavery, let it come to that." The 
General had already been engaged in the problem of providing 
food, shelter, and clothing for large numbers of slaves 
who had left their masters. Grant commissioned John Eaton, 
a teacher and Presbyterian minister, to handle the problem. 
Eaton's duties were carried on without the sanction of law 
7 2 and without any special Federal appropriations. Probably 
the Proclamation was welcomed by the men who worked to 
enable the Negro to sustain himself. They might now begin 
"^Qlbid. , p. 42. 
^^Catton, Hallowed Ground, p. 150. 
^^E. B. Long (ed.). Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant 
(New York: The World Publishing Co., 1952), p. 221. 
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to look for at least some financial assistance or supplies 
from the government -
To those charged with administering the spiritual 
needs of the fighting men, emancipation could bring only-
good. They recognized the great task that was before them 
in caring for a race which had exercised little independence 
and practically no responsibility- Slavery, to the Union 
clergy concerned with the war, was inherently evil. The 
burdens of liberation were accepted as their good works to 
save the nation from the curse of slaveryTen days 
before he issued the Preliminary Proclamation, Lincoln was 
beseeched by a delegation of Christians of all denominations 
from Chicago to proclaim general emancipation. This group 
held that the recent military diasters were tokens of Divine 
displeasure and that it was the solemn obligation of 
74 
Christxanity to bear the burden of emancipation. Now that 
the declaration of intent was before them, they had no 
intention of letting the President waver or forget the day 
of reckoning. Prayers and thanks were offered, and appeals 
Clay Trumbull, War Memories of an Army Chaplain 
(New York: Charles Scribner ' s Sons, 1906), pp. 367-412. 
^^Lincoln: Collected Works, V, 419-425. 
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were made to Europe to keep hands off now that the war was 
"invested with sanctity. 
Newspapers in the North during the war were relatively-
free agents. Northern papers, as instruments of propaganda, 
disseminated the opinion and thoughts of various groups, 
according to the management of the paper and as a rule were 
not influenced by governmental pressure or restraint. The 
press reports on the Emancipation Proclamation bore 
testimony to governmental leniency in news control during 
the Civil War. Much as in normal times, the papers of the 
war period continued to bear the partisan stamp of the 
particular groups which they represented. 
The Northern journalists gave their readers four 
alternate ways of looking at the Proclamation. It was what 
the people had been waiting for; it was a step in the right 
direction but did not go far enough; it was not valid, and 
therefore meant nothing; or it was a surrender to radical 
abolitionism and would wreak havoc on the economic and social 
structure of the nation. 
Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, 
representing the first view in his "Prayer of Twenty 
7 5. Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 61. 
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Million," had the Proclamation printed in full and on the 
bottom added his only comment, "God Bless Abraham Lincoln. 
The next day the Tribune explained all that the President's 
decree meant, and the significance of the act in history-
"In all ages there has been no act of one man and of one 
people so sublime as this emancipation of a race."^^ The 
New York Times took a similar view, but traced the importance 
only as far back as the "foundation of the government."^® 
A week later the Times presented several issues raised by 
the Proclamation. It noted that contrary to the worst 
expectations of some there had been no servile insurrections. 
Predicting the future, in the event that the secessionists 
did not comply with the preliminary edict, the Times 
declared there would be disorganization in the South; 
that Negroes would fill the draft quotas in the North; and 
that the Southerners would respond with fierce reprisals. 
The Times then concluded with, "how much wiser for the vast 
future would be a rational return by the cotton states to 
the Union. In the months of November and December the 
^^New York Tribune, Sept. 23, 1852. 
^^Ibid.. Sept. 24, 1852. 
7p 
New York Times, Sept. 23, 1852. 
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Times acknowledged the Emancipation Proclamation by 
publishing resolutions and petitions from various social 
groups with pledged support for Lincoln's decree.^® The 
National Republican prophesied that the Proclamation would 
restore all old friends to the President, and that the 
country would form a solid line of support for the war 
g 1 
effort. From Boston the editors of the Evening Transcript 
declared that the Emancipation Proclamation was the 
endorsement of an antislavery principle which would be 
Q  ̂  
succeeded by its practical application. 
In the West,^^ Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago 
Tribune, had advocated the unconditional and uncompensated 
^^Ibid., Nov. 28, Dec. 10, 1862. 
81 National Republican, Sept. 2 3 ,  1862. 
^^Evening Transcript, Sept. 23, 1862. 
8 3 
In the Northwest area (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin) the Democrats had played on the 
concept of "white supremacy" and argued that emancipation 
would cause a black invasion of the area. The Preliminary 
Proclamation of Sept. 22 served as a prime target for 
Democratic newspapers. See Detroit Free Press Sept. 28, 
Oct. 23, 28, 31, Nov. 2, 1862; Chicago Times Sept. 23, 27 
and Oct. 3; Dubuque Herald Sept. 30, Oct. 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 14, 1862. Columbus Crisis Oct. 22, 29, 1862. The 
Republicans generally avoided a defense of the Proclamation 
on humanitarian grounds, but insisted that slave confiscation 
and emancipation was desperately needed to win the war and 
restore the Union. See Terre Haute Express Sept. 16, 1862; 
Columbus Ohio State Journal, Sept. 4 and Oct. 8, 1862; 
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 23 and Oct. 8 and 19, 1862; 
••'js.uk-c; Csr.tinel, Oct. 10, 31, and Nov. 3, 1862. 
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abolition of slavery from the beginning of the war. Although 
Lincoln's Proclamation came short of his expectations, he 
declared that "the President has set his hand and affixed 
the great seal to the grandest proclamation ever issued by 
man." Medill explained further that "from this proclamation 
begins the history of the Republic, as our Fathers designed 
to have it—let no one think to stay the glorious 
reformation."^^ The Chicago Tribune gave thorough coverage 
to every public demonstration which acclaimed the 
Proclamation.®^ In the fall elections of 1862 in which the 
Democrats took nine of the fourteen seats in the House 
available from Illinois, the Chicago Tribune counseled 
fellow Republicans to justify the Emancipation Proclamation 
in terms of its effect upon the "happiness, the freedom and 
the pco^erity of the Whites in the North. We need not go 
beyond that; if we do we bring the prejudices of casts 
and races into full play, and by weakening the efforts of 
the North we impair the good the proclamation promises." 
The opinion of the Springfield Republican was that the 
®'^Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1862. 
Q^Ibid.. Sept. 27, Oct. 21, 1862. 
Q^Ibid., Nov. 3, 1862. 
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President's action was thorough, neither excessive nor 
"defeating itself by halfway measures." The editors 
declared that "the greatest social and political revolution 
of the age will be triumphantly carried through in the 
midst of the Civil War."87 The effects of the election did 
not change the Springfield Republican's opinion, while from 
Missouri, the Missouri Democrat claimed that the 
Proclamation helped the Republican party in the November 
elections. 
Proponents of the second notion, that the President's 
edict was a good, though timid start, were extreme 
abolitionists who did not support any political figure 
unless he advocated the complete destruction of slavery-
From this camp, William L. Garrison, editor of the 
Liberator, esqalained that the edict was an act of uncommon 
historical importance, but not one equal to what was 
required. Garrison said Lincoln's Proclamation called for 
the emancipation of three-fourths of the slave population 
as fast as they became accessible. It forbade the return 
of fugitive slaves. But it was objectionable to the 
^^Springfield Republican, Sept. 24, 1852. 
^^Missouri Democrat, Nov. 7, 1862. 
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Liberator's editor because it returned to "bloody stripes, 
horrible torture, and lifelong slavery any hunted bondsmen 
on mere oath of the villain claiming him, that he is loyal." 
Garrison objected further, because the Proclamation proposed 
to make a new offer to the slave states to save their slave 
system, and because of its "mean, absurd, proscriptive device 
to expatriate the colored people from their native land."®^ 
James Welling, editor of the National Intelligencer, 
supported the third contention, that the Proclamation was 
of no value. He said: 
With our well-known and oft repeated views respecting 
the inutility of such proclamations, it can hardly 
be necessary for us to say that, where we expect no 
good, we shall be only too happy to find that no 
harm has been done by the present declaration. 
Between the Proclamation of Hunter and that of 
President Lincoln, we see little difference 
except in the signatures respectively attached 
to them.^*^ 
Welling later wrote of the issuance of the "Emancipation 
of Abraham Lincoln" as "a day of elemental stir." He found 
91 the ground "still quaking beneath our feet." The New 
York Journal of Commerce declared it was useless to discuss 
the Proclamation as it was proclaimed and could not be 
RQ 
Liberator, Sept. 26, 1852. 
90 
National Intelligencer, Sept. 2 3 ,  1852. 
91 Rice, Reminiscences of Lincoln, p. 557. 
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recalled, but qualified this statement by noting "it is not 
law for we have not reached a point where the President 
makes law by proclamationFrom Maine the Portland Age 
thought that it was absurd to cite"military necessity as 
justification for doing an unconstitutional act three or 
Q O 
four months hence. 
In the fourth journalistic construction of Lincoln's 
emancipation policy, it was pointed out that commercial 
interests saw in the destruction of slave-labor and the 
deportation of the slaves, the destruction of Northern 
shipping, as well as Southern cotton and tobacco industries. 
The New York Journal of Commerce asked: "What interest has 
commerce in prosecuting a war upon such destructive and 
revolutionary principles?"The New York Express warned 
that "This fools cap thunder would add 300,000 men to the 
rebel armies, and bring 30,000 Kentuckians to the side of 
Bragg. It is grandscale bunkum, swaggering bravado, which, 
alas! ̂ ^as7 converted a war for the Constitution into a war 
92 New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 23, 1862. 
93 Portland Age cited in National Intelligencer, 
Oct. 7, 1862. 
^^New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 24, 1862. 
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against Southern rights and liberties95 ^he New York 
World believed that the South would fight harder, and that 
"the Union could never be restored without a reversal of the 
96 
President's actions." The Buffalo Courier criticized the 
President for inciting a servile war.^^ The Chicago Times 
in its denunciation of Lincoln's Proclamation, concluded 
that by the issuance of the edict, "the war is reduced to 
a contest of subjugation. It has assumed that character 
that abolitionism has designed from the outset it should 
assume." 
In the days immediately following the issuance of 
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, President 
Lincoln had encountered some very disturbing circumstances. 
The Republican party had a setback in the Congressional 
elections. Efforts to effect colonization were fruitless. 
The border states had spurned his plan for compensated 
emancipation. And there was grumbling within military ranks. 
The President, nevertheless was determined to carry through 
^^New York Express, Oct. 20, 1862-
^^New York World, Sept. 26, 1862. 
^^Buffalo Courier cited in National Intelligencer, 
Oct. 7, 1862. 
98 
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his declared policy on emancipation. In his Second Annual 
Message to Congress (December 3, 1862), Lincoln explained 
the unsuccessful attempts to carry out the colonization 
program but he sounded a note of optimism for augmenting a 
"considerable migration to Liberia and Hayti err long." 
He reviewed the events of the past year and then outlined 
the future needs of the country which he believed would 
eventually attain a population of two-hundred million people. 
The President recommended that Congress, in the form of a 
joint resolution, propose to the legislatures of the several 
states, that they adopt a constitutional amendment consisting 
of three articles: one providing compensation in bonds for 
every State which would abolish slavery before the year 1900; 
another securing freedom to all slaves who, during the 
rebellion, had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war 
—also providing compensation to legal owners; and the 
third authorizing Congress to provide for Colonization. 
President Lincoln said that this recommendation was "not 
in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring 
and preserving the national authority throughout the Union." 
In order to be sure that no one would misconstrue the 
motives for his plan, the President explained: "Nor will 
the war, nor proceedings under the proclamation of 
- 83 -
September 22, 1862, be stayed because of the "recommendation' 
of this plan. Its timely 'adoption', I doubt not, would 
bring restoration and thereby stay both."^^ It was thus 
made clear that in spite of the unfavorable circumstances 
which prevailed, he had not intended to irodiEy his announced 
policy regarding freedom for the slaves. 
Congress began immediately to discuss Lincoln's 
emancipation policy as it was outlined in his message. 
The anti-administration critics demonstrated that they had 
no intention of complying with the President's request. 
The Representative from Kentucky, George H. Yeaman, placed 
before the House of Representatives two resolutions. One 
to the effect that the President's proclamation of 
September 22 was not warranted by the Constitution. The 
other Yeaman resolution denied that the policy of 
emancipation was either conducive to a rapid restoration of 
peace or suitable as a war measure. Moreover, such an 
assumption might prove dangerous to democratic institutions. 
Yeaman followed these resolutions with a long speech wherein 
he attempted to demonstrate, that the President's 
Q Q  
Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1862, in 
Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 
of the President (Washington, D.C. : Bureau of National 
Literature, 1912), V, 3337. 
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Proclamation, was a usurpation of power detrimental to the 
welfare of the nation. The Kentucky Congressman called 
attention to the sentiments expressed by the Senate, the 
House, and President Lincoln immediately after the rebellion 
broke out in 1861. He noted that at that time both chambers 
of Congress in conjunction with the Chief Executive, 
maintained there was no constitutional right to interfere 
with the domestic policies of the separate states. Congress­
man Yeaman asked why and how this construction had changed. 
After completing his long review of past events, Mr. Yeaman 
gave the bases for his own opposition and those of his 
constituents to the Emancipation Proclamation. He listed 
reasons for humanity and Christianity, but above all, he 
was "against it as being the cause to which the friends 
and leaders of the rebellion may and will attribute their 
ultimate success, if ever a calamity so unmeasured overtakes 
the fortunes of the republic." The protest supposedly was 
not leveled against the President but against the "vengeful 
and blood thirsty" influences on the Executive. The 
^^^Speech of the Honorable George H. Yeaman, in 
Papers from the Society for the Diffusion of Political 
Knowledge (New York: 1863) . 
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Kentuckian's resolution was defeated by a vote in the House 
of ninety-four to forty-f ive . 
President Lincoln's critics in the House were relent­
less in their attacks against his Proclamation. The Ohio 
"Peace Democrat," Clement L. Vallandigham, champion of the 
cause against the Lincoln administration, keynoted the 
attacks by proposing a resolution that anyone attempting 
to turn the war into one that would overthrow the 
102 institutions of the States shall be guilty of a high crime. 
Hendrick B. Wright of Pennsylvania requested that Congress 
adopt a resolution stating that the war was being fought 
solely for the purpose of restoring the Union and not to 
undertake any crusades.With the 1862 Congressional 
elections just past, some of the Democratic Representatives 
undertook to interpret the meaning of the election results 
to the House. On December 15, Samuel Cox, of Ohio, 
opposition leader in the House, took the floor and delivered 
a speech on "The Meaning of the Late Election." Mr. Cox 
began by calling attention to the developing practice in 
^Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 79. 
^O^Ibid., p. 15. 
^Q^Ibid.. p. 23. 
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England of the administration, which had lost the confidence 
of the electorate, of surrendering its offices. "But here, 
sir," explained Cox, "in this boasted free country, when 
our great States have pronounced against the Congress and 
against the emancipation and other schemes here hatched, we 
have mockery, defiance, and persistency in wrong doing." 
The Congressman insisted that the people had condemned the 
edict of emancipation but the President with brazen affront-
ery had brought the scheme before Congress in his annual 
message. Piece by piece. Congressman Cox tore at the 
Presidential message. He alluded to the radicalism of 
the North and branded it as more dangerous than the radicalism 
that had brought secession. Throughout his speech he held 
to the theme that the election results served as a notice 
, .. . . 104 
against abolitionists. 
John W- Menzies, a Representative from Kentucky 
explained that he had never belonged to the Democratic party 
but he did rejoice at the success of that party in its 
opposition to abolition in the late election. He wanted 
personally to "thank the Democrats of the North for the noble 
stand they had taken against the Administration. And," he 
^^^Conqressional Globe, 37 Con., 3 Sess., pp. 94 100. 
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said, "I think I can safely say that the Union men of the 
border States will co-operate with them. "^*^5 
Many of the attacks against the administration were 
introduced as resolutions before the House. But when voted 
upon, they ultimately were defeated. Nevertheless, the 
dissenters were able to use the resolutions as a sounding 
board for their views against the emancipation policies and 
as a means of expressing their displeasure with the conduct 
of the war. The more radical abolitionists in Congress, 
however discouraged they might have been with the substance 
of the Emancipation Proclamation, refused to be cheated of 
their gain towards abolition by the maneuvers of the 
opposing party-
The Congressional defenders of the President's 
Proclamation carefully checked each inroad against the 
emancipation program. William D. Kelley, Representative 
from Pennsylvania decried the use of arguments based upon 
the constitutional rights of rebels. He insisted that 
slavery and freedom were incompatible and hence that the war 
itself had been inevitable. The Congressman proclaimed that 
emancipation would be enforced; this was as certain as the 
^^^Ibid., pp. 79-82. 
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coming of the new year. To the charge that the decree was 
unconstitutional, Kelley replied that no one would "dispute 
the validity of the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief 
inviting to our flag people of the rebel States, and 
promising them protection and the enjoyment of Constitutional 
rights.Representative John Hutchins of Ohio said that 
he preferred the proclamation of September 22 to the plan 
the President had submitted to Congress in his annual 
message. The idea of amending the Constitution to purchase 
the slaves of all the States, including those in rebellion, 
was, to Hutchins, harmless amusement if it did not precede 
"the throwing at them the hard stones of war." The Ohioan 
argued that "if the President's proclamation is abandoned 
for this buying-off process, I fear we shall lose the last 
best hope of the earth." Hutchins firmly believed that the 
President not only had the right to issue his Emancipation 
Proclamation, but that by the nature of the rebellion he was 
107 obligated to issue it. 
The Republicans were as tenacious in upholding the 
President's Proclamation as were the Democrats insistent 
^^^Concfressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., pp. 153 154. 
107 
Ibid., pp. 77-79. 
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upon censuring it. Several days after the defeat of the 
Yeaman resolution (Dec. 11), Representative Samuel C. 
Fessenden from Maine proposed that the House endorse the 
President's decree. He listed five reasons; the decree was 
warranted by the Constitution; the Proclamation was well 
adapted to hasten the restoration of peace; emancipation 
was a sound war measure; the edict was a judicious exercise 
of power with proper regard for State's rights; and finally 
emancipation made good the prosperity of free government. 
The resolution was adopted. As the vote against the Yeaman 
resolutions was in a two-to-one ratio (94-45), it is 
interesting to note that Fessenden's resolution was adopted 
X08 by a much narrower margin (78-51). 
As the hundred day period of grace passed, the 
emancipation idea continued to be the subject of discussion 
by newspaper editors and on the floor of Congress. There were 
indications that the President's Proclamation had strong 
support in many areas, but there also were severe attacks 
against the policy and its author. Some felt the need to 
visit the President and assure him of their support and get 
his assurance that the final edict would be issued. Senator 
^Q^Ibid., p. 79. 
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dnairles Svunneir, du.ird.ng' his caiT\pa.ign foir ire~election. in 
Massachusetts, exulted over the Proclamation, "Thank God, 
the skies are brighter and the air is purer, now that 
slavery has been handed over to judgmentBut Sumner, 
too, became apprehensive lest something might interfere to 
cause the President to modify his stand. He therefore paid 
a Christmas Eve visit to President Lincoln and discussed the 
final Proclamation with him. The Senator was relieved when 
the President told him he would not stop the Proclamation 
if he could and could not if he would.An Illinois 
Senator and friend of Lincoln, Orville Browning, felt that 
the Proclamation was unfortunate and would do no good- He 
attempted to dissuade Lincoln from issuing it.^^^ As 
Browning saw the situation, it was inevitable that Lincoln 
would issue the final edict. He concluded that, "the 
Proclamation will come—God grant it may not be productive 
of the mischief I fear."^^^ The Secretary of Navy, Gideon 
^^^Quoted in New York Times, Oct. 7, 1862. 
110..The Emancipation Pen," Proceedings of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, XLIV (1910-1911) , 596. 
^^^Maurice G. Baxter, Orville Browning, Lincoln's 
Friend and Critic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1957) , pp. 147-148. 
112pranklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 90. 
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Welles, observed that the Proclamation was in its immediate 
effects less exciting than he had feared. In his opinion 
"it caused but little jubilation on one hand, nor much angry 
outbreak on the other." The Secretary reflected that the 
speculations as to the sentiments and opinions of the Cabinet 
on the measure were "ridiculously wild and strange. 
From New York, came letters urging the President to 
issue his final Proclamation. Henry J. Raymond, editor of 
the New York Times, wrote to express his support and revealed 
his hope that the war would not be "subservient to the 
sweeping abolition of slavery" as he feared the "border 
States would be driven from the Union. I suggest then," 
wrote Raymond, "that the Proclamation to be issued in 
114 
January, take the form of a military order." The New 
York lawyer, Charles Kirkland, wrote Lincoln and enclosed 
a copy of his reply to Benjamin Curtis who had published an 
attack on the Emancipation Proclamation.In his rebuttal 
of Curtis, Kirkland pointed to an appeal made by the Governor 
Welles's Diary, I, 158. 
^^^Lincoln; Collected Works, V. 544-545. 
^Rebuttal of the Honorable Charles Kirkwood 
Papers From the Society for the Diffusion of Political 
Knowledge (New York: 1863) . 
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of Georgia for Negro labor to build fortifications around 
Savannah. Kirkland's purpose was to show how the 
Proclamation would deprive the rebels of a vital means of 
carrying out the war. Kirkland asked: "In reason, in common 
sense, in national law, in the law of civilized war, what 
objection can exist to our using our war power to attain 
an end so just, so lawful, and I may say so beneficient, 
and so humane; as thus depriving our 'enemy* of his means 
of warfare?" The lawyer denied that the Proclamation was 
either absolute or unconditional. He pointed to the 
hundred-day grace period, and the recommendation that 
compensation should be made to the loyal citizens who had 
sustained losses due to operation of the Proclamation. 
The President thanked Kirkland for himself and the nation 
saying it appeared to him (Lincoln) to be a paper of great 
ability. 
For the abolitionists and Negroes there was tense 
anticipation and much preparation to herald the coming New 
Year and the promised Emancipation Proclamation. The 
literary stylists of the day tried to capture the thoughts 
^^^Ibid., p. 8. 
ll^Lincoln: Collected Works, V, 544. 
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a.rid einotions of tlnose v/lno wouild be weXcomin̂  tine Presicierit' s 
Proclamation, for the liberating power it would possess. 
Quite eloquent and moving were the lines of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson who deliberated on the deeper meaning of Lincoln's 
measure: 
A day which most of us dared not hope to see, 
an event worth the dreadful war... seems now to be 
close before us. October, November, December will 
have passed over beating hearts and plotting 
brains. Then the hour will strike, and all men of 
African descent who find their way to our lines 
are assured of the protection of American law. 
It is by no means necessary that this measure 
should be suddenly marked by any signal results 
on the Negroes or on the Rebel masters. The force 
of the act is that it commits the country to this 
justice. It is not a measure that admits of being 
taken back. Done, it cannot be undone. 
The act makes clear that the lives of our heroes 
have not been sacrificed in vain. It makes a 
victory of our defeats. Our hurts are healed. 
The health of the nation is repaired. 
With a victory like this, we can stand many 
disasters- We have recovered ourselves from our 
false position, and planted ourselves on a law of 
Nature. It is well to delay the steamers at the 
wharves, until this edict could be put on board. 
Happy are the young who find the pestilence 
cleansed out of the earth, leaving open to them an 
honest career. Happy the old, who see Nature 
purified before they depart. Do not let the dying 
die; hold them back to this world until you have 
charged their ear with this message to other 
spiritual societies I" 
^^^Atlantic Monthly (November 1862), X, 538 642. 
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During the closing days of the year, the 29th, 30th, 
and 31st of December, cabinet sessions were held to make 
preparation for the final Proclamation. The President 
showed great solicitude. His preliminary draft was printed 
and distributed to each member of the cabinet so that each 
could examine, criticize, and make such recommendations as 
occurred to them. Chase felt the paper was so important 
and involved the liberties of so many, it should make some 
reference to the Deity. The President assented and asked 
Chase to work something out. The next day, the Secretary of 
the Treasury presented what was to be the closing phrase of 
the President's document: "And upon this act, sincerely 
believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the 
Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the 
considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of 
Almighty God. " 
When the part of the Proclamation, containing the 
exception of States and parts of States not to be affected 
by the decree came under discussion. Postmaster General 
Montgomery Blair, stressed the importance of the Proclamation 
as a state paper. "People in aftertimes," he said, "might 
^^^Rice, Reminiscenses of Lincoln, p. 91-
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read and wonder why the 13 parishes and the city of New 
Orleans in Louisiana, and counties in Virginia about Norfolk, 
were excepted from the Proclamation, since," as he said, 
"they are in the very heart and back of slavery." Blair 
also felt that unless there was some good reason he hoped 
they would not be excepted. The President explained to the 
Cabinet the circumstances of a promise and the possible 
return of these areas to the Union. Seward agreed together 
with Blair that the President should keep his promise and 
1 ? 0 not change the emancipation paper. 
On the afternoon of December 31, with the cabinet 
meeting over, Lincoln carefully re-wrote the Proclamation, 
embodying in it the accepted suggestions which had been made. 
He adhered to his own draft in keeping the exceptions as to 
fractional parts of several states and the forty-eight 
western counties of Virginia, which were soon to form a new 
State in the Union. 
The Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, empowered the 
President to organize and use Negroes as he deemed was 
^^^Ibid., p. 92. 
^^^On this day, Lincoln also signed the bill admitting 
West Virginia into the Union, but the effective date of 
admission was not until June 20, 1853. Welles's Diary, I, 
p. 191. 
- 96 -
necessary to suppress the Rebellion.Accordingly, and 
partly because of the constant urging from his Secretary 
123 
of War, Edwin Stanton, Lincoln declared all qualified 
emancipated Negroes would be received into the Union armed 
forces. Nothing had been said in the preliminary Proclamation 
about the use of Negroes as soldiers. Absent from the final 
draft was the mention of the President's much cherished 
plan for colonization and compensation. Thursday, 
January 1, 1863, after the definitive document was prepared 
in all the necessary details, and the formalities of the 
traditional New Year's Day reception at the White House had 
been attended to. President Abraham Lincoln signed and put 
124 into effect his Proclamation of Emancipation. 
The contemporary writers of the time told of a Grand 
Emancipation Jubilee which the free Negroes of the North 
and their abolitionist friends staged to herald the 
occasion. In Boston such literary figures as John Greenleaf 
Whittier, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Ralph Waldo Emerson had gathered at the Music Hall to 
^^^U.S,, Statutes at Large, XII, 592. 
^^^Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, pp. 229-250. 
^^^U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, appendix, 1268-1269. 
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hear the Philharmonic Orchestra and a chorus which sang 
Mendelsohn's "Hymn of Praise" and Holmes' army song.^^^ 
Emerson had written the "Boston Hymn" which he read to the 
audience for the occasion.The Union Progressive 
Association had rented the Tremont Temple in Boston where a 
large crowd gathered to hear speeches and await the news 
that the President had signed the Proclamation. Frederick 
Douglass wrote of the despondency and gloom of the audience 
there as the crowd waited for several hours and heard no 
word. "Suddenly," wrote Douglass, "a messenger burst into 
the hall shouting, 'It's coming 1 It's on the wires!' The 
cheers shook the Hall."^^^ Demonstrations took place in 
many part of the country to herald the Emancipation 
Proclamation. 
With a few notable exceptions, the Northern press 
releases on the final Proclamation closely paralleled the 
reports which were written during the one-hundred day period 
of grace which followed the Preliminary Proclamation. 
William L. Garrison who had written his objections to the 
^^^Franklin, Emancipation Proclamation, p. 110. 
^^^Atlantic Monthly, XI, p. 237. 
Philip S. Foner, The Life and Writings of Frederick 
Douglass (New York: International Publisher Co., Inc., 
1952), III, p. 336-337. 
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preliminary edict in his newspaper, the Liberator, now 
maintained that the final Proclamation had cleared "their 
2^he abolitionist^ course from all doubts, and their 
128 
process from all uncertainty. Wendell Phillips, the 
"Prophet of Liberty." said he was especially pleased that 
the final Proclamation did not mention colonization. He 
stated also, that he was pleased to note that the Negroes 
would be conscripted to serve in the armed forces against 
the rebels. He interpreted the President's decree to say 
to the Negro: "Let me colonize you in the Forts of the 
Union, and put rifles in your hands. Give us your hand to 
J.29 defend the perpetuity of the Union. The New York Tribune, 
which reported the proclamation of September as the greatest 
act since "all the ages" became critical of the exceptions 
of Tennessee and Louisiana in the final decree. Greeley, 
the editor of the Tribune, argued against the exceptions 
on the basis that these two states had "more than one-
hundred-thousand of their citizens in arms to destroy the 
Union." Mr. Greeley, however, said he did not want to 
^^^Liberator, Jan. 9, 1863. 
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"cavil," and he predicted that the Proclamation would do 
much to lower the South' s pride and diminish its power. 
The National Intelligencer held to their initial 
interpretation that the Proclamation was of no use. The 
Intelligencer declared that the proponents of slavery have 
nothing to complain of, as the final edict is powerless to 
destroy slavery outside the range of the Union Armies. The 
editor considered the Proclamation as expressly designed to 
shelter slavery in the state of Tennessee, which was still 
131 in the theatre of military operations. 
The Democratic press, as previously, denounced the 
Proclamation. The Democrats called it the "last card of 
T O O  
the Jacobins." They further labeled the edict as unwise, 
ill-timed, unnecessary, impractical, stupendous folly, 
133 
outside of the Constitution, and full of mischief. 
From Ashland, Ohio, a Copperhead journal, the Union, 
remarked: "We publish in another column the Emancipation 
^^^New York Tribune, Jan. 3, 1863. 
131 
National Intelligencer, Jan. 3, 1863. 
132 
'Jacobins ' was the name given to the extreme 
abolitionists in Congress by their Democratic opponents. 
^^^New York Herald, Jan. 3, 1863; New York World, 
Jan. 3, 1863; Boston Courier, Washington Chronicle; 
Cincinnati Gazette; cited in the Liberator, Jan. 9, 1863. 
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Proclamation issued January 1, 1863, by the tyrant and 
usurper, Lincoln 
In Congress, before a packed house, Clement L. 
Vallandigham, the Ohio 'Peace Democrat', spoke for an hour 
and a half against the supporters of the war. The Ohioan 
accused the Republican administration and Republican 
controlled Congress of having promoted a war which was, 
according to him, a bloody and costly failure. "The 
President confessed it on 22 of September, solemnly, 
officially, and under the broad seal of the United States," 
said Vallandigham. And he declared that "War for the 
Union was abandoned, war for the Negro openly begun. 
The views of Vallandigham and the anti-war editors were 
underwritten by scores of local mass meetings and county 
conventions of the Democratic party. At one of the mass 
meetings which was held at Springfield, Illinois, the 
Democrats resolved that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
as unwarranted in military as in civil law; and that it 
^^^Cited in New York Tribune, Jan. 21, 1853. 
^^^Conqressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., 314, 
Appendix 52-60. 
X 3 0 
Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the 
Copperheads (New York; Viking Press, 1942); Nevins, War 
for the Union. II, 388-391. 
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was a gigantic usurpation, converting the war, properly-
begun for the vindication of the authority of the 
Constitution, into a crusade for the liberation of three 
million Negro slaves. Such a result, they said, would 
overthrow the Union and revolutionize the social organization 
137 
of the Southern states. 
The primary purpose of the Emancipation Proclamation 
was to serve as a military measure for the more effective 
prosecution of the war. That it was a military measure can 
be seen by the wording of the decree itself, by the repeated 
insistence of its author, and mainly, by the effect the 
decree had within the Union armies. 
Before emancipation was publicly declared as a policy 
of the administration, it was understood, by the War 
Department that slaves (or contrabands) of rebels could not 
be returned to their masters; that, in common humanity, 
the fugitive slaves must not be permitted to suffer for want 
of food, shelter, or other necessities of life; that to a 
limited extent, the contrabands should be provided for by the 
quartermaster and the commissary departments; and that those 
capable should be provided employment for wages. In doing 
^^^Quoted in New York Tribune, Jan. 10, 1853. 
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this much for the fugitive slaves, it was not meant to settle 
any general rule in respect to slaves or slavery, but simply 
to provide for the particular care under the circumstances 
in which it was presented. Still without a general policy, 
there were no congressional appropriations, and quartermaster 
and commissary provisions were seldom in sufficient amounts 
to meet the existing needs. It was noted in General 
Grant's command, that the military leaders had to devise 
their own means to handle the matter.This was changed 
to a large extent by the final Proclamation, which 
authoritatively announced that persons of suitable condition, 
whom the edict declared free, would be received into the 
armed service of the United States. 
During the next few months, after the final 
Proclamation was issued, the President wrote personal 
letters to the commanders in the field urging that they 
make a special effort to promote the new policy and use 
Negro troops wherever possible. More to the purpose. 
General Lorenzo Thomas, Army Adjutant General, was personally 
sent to the Union camps along the Mississippi River to speak 
ISSiphomas and Hyman, Stanton, pp. 23 2, 235. 
^^^John Eaton, Grant, Lincoln and the Freedman (New 
York: Longmans and Green Co., 1907), pp. 5-6, 8. 
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in behalf of the President's policy on fugitive slaves 
entering the Union lines. The men were told that the 
President wished the White soldiers to receive the Negroes 
kindly and cordially- General Thomas also had charge of 
raising colored regiments, and of selecting Whites for 
commissions to lead these regiments. In addition, the 
Department of War created a Bureau of Colored Troops to take 
special charge of the welfare of the colored soldiers and 
140 
their families. The co-operation of General Grant and 
other Union commanders in the Mississippi theatre, gave 
the program, in Lincoln's estimation, encouraging and 
141 
gratifying success. 
The problems incident to consumating the emancipation 
policy are noted by the response of the different commanders. 
General Dix, commanding at Fortress Monroe and York Town, 
considered the tranquility of Maryland essential to the 
strength of his command. The General believed that Fortress 
Monroe was the key position to the Chesapeake Bay area and 
he explained in a letter to the President, that, from a 
political point of view, the residents of Maryland might 
^^^Lincoln: Collected Works, VI, 408. 
- 104 -
have become disturbed if he used colored troops to garrison 
the fortress. However, General Dix was eager to use Negro 
soldiers at York Town where, he believed, the army's 
operations were not too noticeable to the general public of 
Maryland. General Grant, in a dispatch to the General-in-
Chief of the Union armies, Henry W- Halleck, gave the subject 
of arming the Negroes his hearty support. "This along with 
the emancipation," said Grant, "is the heaviest blow yet 
given the Confederacy." His only complaint was a positive 
one--that there was difficulty in securing enough able-bodied 
142 Negroes. 
The recruitment of Negroes as armed participants in 
the war was staunchly opposed by the citizens of Kentucky 
who sent a deputation to Washington to discuss the matter 
with President Lincoln. The deputation, consisting of 
Albert G. Hodes, editor of the Frankfurt, Common Salter, 
Governor Branlett, and Archibald Dixon, former Senator of 
Kentucky, questioned the President on the paradox of his 
Proclamation and the revocation of General Fremont and 
General Hunter's proclamation. The President replied that 
Fremont and Hunter's orders were not indispensable and 
^^^Ibid., p. 375. 
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stressed the fact that in March, May, and July of 1862, he 
had made appeals to the border states to adopt a plan of 
compensated emancipation which was turned down. Lincoln 
explained that the only alternatives left to him were 
surrender or turning to the "black element." He further 
explained that his decision to declare a policy on 
emancipation had proved suitable to meet the exigency. 
President Lincoln then emphasized this point: 
And now let any Union man who complains of the 
measure test himself by writing down in one line 
that he is for subduing the rebellion by force of 
arms; and in the next, that he is for taking 
130,000 men from the Union side, and placing them 
where they would be but for the measure he condemns. 
If he cannot face his case so stated, it is because 
he cannot face the truth. 
There is some evidence that military favor was 
awarded to those who had the "right" attitude toward 
emancipation. In some instances, a few were penalized for 
not endorsing the Proclamation. General Benjamin F. Butler, 
who was relieved of his command at New Orleans in 
December, 1852, found difficulty in obtaining the reasons 
for his release. But after Senator Sumner defended the 
General's position in regard to unqualified support for 
emancipation and the recruiting of colored troops, Butler 
^^^Lincoln: Collected Works, VII, 281-282. 
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was reinstated as coiranander of the Department of the Gulf. 
Secretary of War, Stanton, said of the incident, that had he 
known, he would rather have cut off his right arm than to 
deny a commander who was so favorably inclined toward the 
144 
new admxnistratxon policy. In another instance. General 
Hunter, commanding in the Department of the South, caused 
some embarassment for President Lincoln by his over zealous 
support of the Emancipation Proclamation. The General had 
a captain removed from the army because he refused to 
endorse the Proclamation. Lincoln wrote to General Hunter. 
He expressed his appreciation for the General's support for 
the Proclamation, but told Hunter he wished to have the 
145 captain restored to hxs former position. 
In order that he might be able to discern for him­
self which Generals were more properly disposed to facilitate 
Negro recruiting and in general uphold the emancipation 
program. Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, kept a close 
vigilance on the military dispatches from the commanders in 
the field to the general-in-chief at Washington. It was by 
^'^'^Thomas cind Hyman, Stanton, p. 257 . 
^^^Lincoln: Collected Works, VI, 1962. 
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this practice that Stanton had come to the decision that 
General Grant should be kept in mind for further 
145 recommendations. 
As the months after the issuance of the final 
Proclamation passed and the Union armies gained control over 
the Mississippi River, Tennessee, and Arkansas, Lincoln 
became convinced that his Proclamation was an influencing 
factor. He became steadfast in his insistence that the 
newly occupied territories endorse emancipation as a 
condition to re-entering the Union as states with represen­
tation in Congress. 
Lincoln received intelligence (July 20, 1863) that 
the former Senator from Arkansas, William K. Sebastian 
contemplated reclaiming his seat in Congress and was 
supported by leading citizens in that state to do so. The 
President sent word through General McClernand, who was 
instrumental in bringing Union control over Arkansas, that 
he would support the Senator if he could get the state to 
adopt the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln asserted, in 
the communique to McClernand, that he believed the edict 
^"^^Thomas and Hymen, Stanton, p. 269. 
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would hold up in court, and that he did not think he would 
"I A 7 retract or repudiate it. 
In a letter to Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of 
Tennessee, Lincoln reminded the Governor that the armed 
insurrectionists had been cleared out of Tennessee just in 
time for Johnson to set up a new state legislature which the 
President believed should adopt a plan for gradual 
] 4R emancipation. ° Johnson, who had spent considerable time 
on a speaking tour in the North, made his position clear on 
the question of slavery. At a large gathering in Indianap­
olis, the largest and most enthusiastic meeting ever held 
149 in Indiana, according to a New York Tribune report, 
Johnson exclaimed: "The time has come to teach the North 
and the South that institutions are not to exist here more 
powerful than the Government itself. To the President, 
the Military Governor wrote that he was for getting it over 
with and suggested a plan for immediate emancipation as the 
^^^Lincoln: Collected Works, VI, 48. 
I'^^Ibid., 440. 
^^^New York Tribune, March 3, 1863. 
^^^Lloyd Paul Stryker, Andrew Johnson; A Study in 
Courage (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 104, 
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answer. The Constitution of Tennessee was amended to include 
immediate emancipation in February, 1865.^^^ 
To some of the abolitionists who had devoted their 
lives to the eradication of slavery in the United States, the 
work that was accomplished under the auspices of the 
Emancipation Proclamation was, in their eyes, the fulfill­
ment of their labor and hopes. One life-long antislavery 
crusader, Henry C. Wright, asked the President to grant him 
(Wright) one favor. Mr. Wright requested President Lincoln 
to write and subscribe his name in his own hand to the 
following sentence: "I shall not attempt to retract or 
modify the emancipation proclamation; nor shall I return to 
slavery any person, who is free by the terms of the 
proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress." Mr. 
Wright told the President that he had campaigned against 
slavery for thirty years. The President complied with 
152 
Wrxght s request. 
President Lincoln in his Annual Message to Congress 
(Dec. 1863) declared that sufficient time had elapsed since 
the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation to prove its 
^^^Ibid., p. 164. 
^^^Lincoln; Collected Works, VII, p. 81. 
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worth as a military measure. Reflecting on the incidents 
of the year past, the President stated that the Proclamation 
had been a significant contribution toward the Union success 
which he believed had been achieved. The rebels had been 
pushed back, the entire Mississippi River was in Union 
hands, and the confederate strength had been "divided into 
distinct parts with no practical communications between them." 
The states of Tennessee and Arkansas had been substantially 
cleared of insurgent control, and Lincoln was pleased to 
note that "influential citizens in each state, owners of 
slaves, and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the 
rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their 
respective states." To the President, it was a matter of 
great satisfaction that Maryland and Missouri, states not 
included in the Emancipation Proclamation, were working 
toward the removal of slavery within their limits. As for 
the Negroes brought into the ranks of the Union armed 
services, the President maintained that it would be difficult 
to say they were not as good soldiers as any. Lincoln 
proudly pointed to the record that no servile insurrection, 
or tendency toward violence or cruelty on the part of the 
- Ill -
Negro had marred the measure of emancipation and the 
recruiting of Negroes. 
The declaration of intent of September 22, 1862 had 
served to stir the Northerner's mind to consider the con­
sequences of emancipation as a war measure. The intended 
policy of emancipation faced serious objection as the moral 
opposition to slavery had not abated the strong determination 
still in the North to preserve White supremacy. 
All the old and pet stereotyped arguments had to be 
heard and answers found during the first hundred days. Thus 
the period of grace served to prepare the American public 
for a new phase in the war, while the final and definitive 
decree of January 1 served to remove all doubts and give 
notice to the nation that the Lincoln administration had 
set its course against slavery- During the year which 
followed, the Union army sustained the edict with the sword, 
but the final and irrevocable emancipation by Constitutional 
amendment was still in the future. The complexity of the 
circumstances surrounding emancipation are ably expressed 
by Carl Sandburg in the following sentences: 
, pp. 49-50. 
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The living issues ̂ ^^ich7 coiled and tangled about 
Lincoln's feet were not, however, to be set smooth 
and straight by any one gesture, or a series of 
them, in behalf of freedom- His authority, worn 
often as garments of thongs, was tied and knotted 
with responsibilities. Nailed with facts of 
inevitable fate was his leadership- The gestures 
of stretching forth his hand and bestowing freedom 
on chattel slaves while attempting to enforce his 
will by the violence of Armies subjugating the 
masters of slaves on their home soil, the act of 
trying to hold a just balance between the opposed 
currents of freedom and authority, raised a riddle 
that gnawed in his thoughts many nights. 
^^"^Sandburg, Prairie Years and War Years, p. 347 . 
CHAPTER III 
SOUTHERN REACTIONS 
The secessionist leaders regarded the election of a 
Republican President in 1850 as a victory of a sectional 
party whose aim was the destruction of the Southern way of 
life. They took at face value the arguments of such anti-
slavery men as Charles Sumner, Salmon P. Chase, and William 
H. Seward. Avid secessionists declared that the Republican 
idea of "higher law" doomed the institution of slavery and 
presaged the uprooting of Southern society- The more 
extreme Southern politicians implied that the election of a 
Republican President would mean that the government would 
be controlled by the Republicans, and that the Union would 
be transformed into a centralized despotism, operating for 
the benefit of the Northern States. They proclaimed that 
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the election of a "Black Republican" to the presidency would 
be sufficient cause for secession.^ 
Lincoln's election was characterized by Southern 
extremists as an open declaration of war to support an 
abolitionist political theory. This theory was explained as 
a design to destroy the property of the South, and inaugurate 
all the horrors of a Santo Domingo style servile insurrection. 
One Southerner, with a flare for the dramatic, declared the 
theory would consign the Southern "citizen to assassination 
and their wives and daughters to pollution and violation to 
2 gratify the lust of half-civilized Africans." Though it 
is unlikely that thoughtful men of the South would have agreed 
with this extreme point of view, it was incumbent upon them 
to be cognizant of the dangers inherent in maintaining a 
slavocracy- It was impressed upon the Southern mind from 
early history that slaves were capable of being organized 
and taught to systematically revolt and overthrow their 
^For a discussion of this issue, see Arthur C. Cole, 
"Lincoln's Election an Immediate Menace to Slavery in the 
States?" American Historical Review, XXXVI, 740-757, 
(July, 1931); and J. G. de Routhac Hamilton, Ibid., XXXVII, 
700-711, (July, 1932). 
^The War of the Rebellion: A Complilation of the 
Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies 
(Washington, 1880-1901), Series IV, Volume I, p. 8. 
Hereafter cited as O.R. 
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masters. In the slave-trade debates at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the South was warned of the dangers of 
over-populating their region with Africans. The Santo 
Domingo revolt was used then, as later, by the Southern 
propagandists as a horrible example of what could happen 
should the slaves be given the opportunity and encouragement 
by agitators from outside the South. The Negroes were viewed 
as persons, who by "their circumstances, their barbarism, 
their reflections, their hopes, and fears render/e^ them 
an enemy /of the whites/ of the worst description."^ 
The slave states had early acknowledged the possible 
threat of servile insurrection, and had enacted slave-codes 
designed to render the slave absolutely dependent upon his 
master for his safety and well beingThe free Negroes 
C 
existing in Southern society were always suspect.-^ They 
3 Annals of Congress, 8 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 995. 
^Dwight L. Dumond, Antislavery: The Crusade for 
Freedom in America (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 
1961), pp. 8-15; Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar 
Institution (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 206-209. 
^Denmark Vesey who led the Charleston revolt in 1822 
was a freedman, as was Nat Turner, the Negro preacher who 
led the 1831 revolution in Southampton, Virginia. See Dwight 
L, Dumond, Antis1avery: The Crusade for Freedom America 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1951), pp. 114, 
116-117. See also pages 10 and 11 above. 
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were recognized as free from bondage, but because of the 
possible danger they posed to the control of slaves, they 
were under constant surveillance and regulated to the point 
where their freedom was not a point of envy to the slave.^ 
The South realized the problem constituted by the great 
number of Negroes in that region. Unwilling to compromise 
his superior station, the Southerner believed that the Negro 
had to be controlled by the methods established under 
slavery- The antislavery attacks from the North were 
regarded as fanatic attempts to submerge the White man, 
and as an additional burden to the problem of Negro control 
in the South. 
The Southern propagandists warned that no reliance 
could be placed upon the pledges of the Republican party. 
The North under the influence of this party, they argued, 
had already violated the spirit and destroyed the vitality 
of the Constitution. The triumph of the Republican party 
meant free Negroes and social equality. That unwelcome 
prospect impressed even the nonslaveholder. Though perhaps 
^Stampp, The Peculiar Institution, pp. 215-126. 
^Rembert Wallace Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His 
Cabinet (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1944), p. 6. 
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he would not give his life to uphold property in slaves, he 
was determined to maintain the supremacy and social control 
over the Negro exercised by the brotherhood of white men.® 
Once secession had been effected and the Confederate 
States of America had been formed and put into operation, 
the Confederate State Department had to deal with the question 
of slavery in a new light. It was the task of the Confederate 
foreign service to impart the idea that secession had taken 
place for Constitutional reasons and not because of any fear 
that the slaves would be liberated. The Southern commissioners 
to Europe, William L. Yancy, Ambrose D. Mann, and Pierre A. 
Rost carefully avoided a dogmatic defense of slavery but 
were quick to explain that the party in power in the United 
States would guarantee to sustain slavery if the South would 
but remain in the Union. 
After the battle of the first Bull Run, the Southern 
Commissioners, in a letter communicated to the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, described what they 
believed were the North's objectives in the conflict. Their 
conununication reminded Lord Russell that Lincoln had stated 
in his first inaugural address that he had no intention 
%lrich Bonnell Phillips, "The Central Theme of 
Southern History," American Historical Review, XXIV, 
(1928-1929) pp. 30-43. 
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of interfering with the institution of slavery as it existed 
within the states. The Commissioners also noted that the 
Federal Congress, in concert with President Lincoln, had 
resolved that the Union forces would not be used for the 
purpose of destroying slavery. With these notations, the 
coiranissioners went on to explain that the North's object 
in the war, therefore, was not to free the slave but to 
subjugate the slave owner. The commissioners then submitted 
their belief that as far as the antislavery sentiment of 
England was concerned, it could have no sympathy with the 
North. They asserted even further that antislavery sentiment 
in England "will probably become disgusted with the canting 
hypocrisy which would enlist those sympathies on false 
pretenses."^ 
In its efforts to gain foreign recognition the South 
undertook to recruit influential citizens of foreign countries 
to work in Confederate organizations. These organizations 
were designed to sell Confederate bonds to help the South 
finance the war, and also to broadcast Southern propaganda 
to win friends to the cause. In one notable instance this 
practice backfired. The circumstances involved in this 
.R.N.. Series 2, Vol. Ill, pp- 244-245. 
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backlash, as briefly described in the following paragraph, 
give some indication of the South's sensitivity on the 
slavery question, especially when broached outside of the 
Confederacy -
James Spence, an influential Liverpool merchant, wrote 
a book entitled The American Union, a defense of the 
Confederacy that experienced a considerable amount of 
success. It had gone through four large editions in less 
than a year. The basic theme of Spence's book was that 
nothing was more essential to the welfare of the American 
p e o p l e  t h a n  a  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  U n i o n . T h e  
author-merchant also organized two London associations to 
help the South. As a reward for his able assistance, the 
Confederation appointed Spence as financial agent in England. 
But to the embarrassment of the Confederate Secretary of 
State, Judah P- Benjamin and his close associates, Spence 
not only held forbidden views on the explosive subject of 
slavery but he did not hesitate to air them. Henry Hotze, 
the South's propaganda agent in England, regretfully 
reported to Benjamin that Spence had given the British public 
the idea that the South would ultimately emancipate the 
^^James Spence, The American Union (London: 
Richard Bentley, 1862), p. 326. 
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Negro slaves. Hotze felt that the public mind in England 
had ceased to expect any promises of emancipation from the 
South, and that they understood self-respect prevented the 
agents from the South from making any. Spence however was 
impressed with the belief that his influence would overcome 
the reticence of the South toward emancipation. Though the 
Englishman was sincere in his philanthropic convictions and 
devotion to the Confederacy, his Confederate associates 
tended to shy away from him.^^ Within a few months, Spence 
and his views became a subject of scandal in the South. 
The Richmond Encfuirer published a scorching editorial 
(May 7, 1863) criticizing the State Department for employing 
Spence and exclaimed: "Here we are paying a man for abusing 
us as a nation of criminals steeped in moral evil."12 
13 As the war progressed, it has been noted, slaves 
captured by the Union forces were in some instances returned 
^^Robert D. Meade, Judah P- Benjamin Confederate 
Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 265. 
^^Richmond Enquirer, May 7, 1863. 
^^See above p. 26. See also O .R. Series 1, Vol. 2, 
pp. 48-49, 662; Thomas Harry Williams, Lincoln and the 
Radicals (University of Wisconsin Press, 1941), pp. 25-26; 
Charles H. Wesley, "The Employment of Negroes as Soldiers in 
the Confederate Army," The Journal of Negro History, Vol. IV 
(July, 1919) pp. 240-241. 
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to their masters. For the South, especially the Negro, 
here was sufficient evidence in the concrete, that slavery 
was not the avowed cause of the conflict. Some Confederate 
leaders believed that to the Negro, as to all the South, the 
invading armies seemed to be attacking independent states, 
invading the homeland, and posing a great threat to the 
very existence of the Negro. This idea is perhaps best 
portrayed by the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. 
Seddon, who in a letter to Jefferson Davis (Nov. 3, 1864) 
explained that with the Whites, the result of the war was a 
question of nationality, of honor,and property- With the 
Negroes, the outcome of the war raised the question, he 
said, of their existence as a race. "The friendship of a 
people so selfish, cruel, and remorseless as our foes, " 
Seddon continued, "would be to the unhappy Negro more fatal 
than to us their enmity. 
That the South was concerned about the conduct of 
the Negro in the face of a war might be illustrated by the 
care the Southern press took to inform its public of the 
14 
O»R.. Series 4, Vol. Ill, pp. 761-762. This notion 
is challenged by the Negro historian W. E. B. Dubois, who 
claimed that as long as the Union stood still and talked, the 
Negro kept quiet and worked. The moment the Union army moved 
into slave territory, the Negro joined it. See W. E. 
Burghardt Dubois, Black Reconstruction in America (New York; 
S. A. Russell Co., 1935), p. 62. 
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behavior of the slaves and free Negroes. Southern newspapers 
did not deny the ever present risk of a slave revolt, but 
publicly, those newspapers examined for this study, reflected 
the thought that the slaves even wanted to be rescued. 
VJhile preparation was under way for an armed conflict, the 
Charleston Mercury called particular attention to the 
services of 150 free Negroes "gratuitously offered" to work 
on the fortifications of that city. The Mercury noted "the 
thousand Negroes who, so far from inclining to insurrection, 
were grinning from ear to ear at the prospect of shooting 
15 
the Yankees." In Tennessee, a newspaper reported a 
procession of several hundred colored men marching through 
the streets of Memphis carrying shovels, axes, and blankets, 
patriotically singing war songs and shouting for Jefferson 
Davis.The Charleston Courier printed a story of two 
Negro boys who allegedly had fled from Fayette County to 
obtain their freedom. But, according to the story, the boys 
did not find the paradise they had sought, and before long 
desired to return to their masters. The result was, so the 
story ran, the Yankees cut off the ears of the colored youths 
^^Charleston Mercury, January, 1851. 
^^Memphis Avalanche, September 3, 1861. 
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who did finally make an escape back to their master's 
plantation. "They are violent haters of Yankees and their 
adventures and experiences," said the Courier, "are a 
terror to Negroes of the region, who learned a lesson from 
1 7 the brethren whose ears are left in LincolndomI" In 
February of 1862, the New Orleans Daily Picayune wrote 
elatedly about a regiment of 1400 colored troops "all well-
dressed, well-drilled, and comfortably uniformed." It was 
explained that most of the companies in this regiment 
1 Q 
provided themselves with arms unaided by the administration. 
These and similar statements from the press were 
designed to serve the two fold purpose of allaying the white's 
fear of servile insurrections and at the same time keep the 
loyalty of the South's indispensable labor force. It is 
difficult to believe that any Southerner who was aware of 
Lincoln's steadfast refusal to allow military commanders to 
proclaim a general emancipation within their commands, plus 
his disclaimers and those of Congress of having any intent 
to destroy slavery, could have avoided being stunned when 
the Emancipation Proclamation was made known to him. 
17 
Charleston Courier, February 18, 1863. 
^®New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 9, 1862. 
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The news of Lincoln's Proclamation produced a reaction 
of indignant hostility in the South. From Richmond, the 
capital of the Confederate Government, the Richmond 
Dispatch, VJhiq, Enquirer, and Examiner published a series of 
vigorous attacks against the decree. Of the four newspapers 
in Richmond, the Enquirer leveled the bitterest denunciation 
against the Lincoln administration. This journal explained 
the Proclamation as the "last extremity of wickedness" on 
the part of the North. The whole course of the Northerners, 
said the Enquirer, was of a nature to remove all the pleas­
ant recollections the South had of the period of their 
association with the North. The editor stated, "Lincoln 
has crowned the pyramid of his infamies with an atrocity 
abhorred of men, and at which even demons should shudder." 
The editorial explained further that Lincoln had pretended 
that he was working for the restoration of the Union, but 
the Proclamation showed him to be '^s black of soul as the 
vilest of the train whose behest he is obeying. So far as 
he can do he has devoted himself to the direst destruction 
that can befall a people. The next day (October 1, 1862) 
the Enquirer recalled the horrors of Nat Turner's 
^^Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 30, 1862. 
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insurrection of 1831 and said that it was the kind of work 
Lincoln desired. Contrasting General Butler with his 
Commander-in-Chief, President Lincoln, the Enquirer suggested 
that if Butler is to be called the "Beast," a more descriptive 
epithet would be needed to describe his "Master." "What 
shall we call him?" the journal asked, "coward, assassin, 
savage, murderer of women and babies: Or shall we consider 
them all as embodied in the word fiend, and call him Lincoln, 
The Fiend? 
The reporters of the Whig, Dispatch, and Examiner 
expressed a general agreement that the proclamation would 
not have any practical consequences in the South and that 
Lincoln had fallen into the hands of the abolitionists. 
The Richmond Examiner, a famous spokesman for the South, 
often quoted in other newspapers in both the North and the 
South. The editor, John M. Daniel, was sometimes described 
as the head of a school of journalism as he frequently called 
for contributions to his paper from some of the more force­
ful young writers in Virginia. Among them, Edward A. 
Pollard is perhaps the best known for his later contribution 
to history. Pollard was forever critical of the Confederate 
^Qlbid., Oct. 1, 1862. 
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President, Jefferson Davis. The young writer ascribed 
Lincoln's courage in venturing upon a "supreme act of out­
rage, one that fairly crowned his unparalleled boldness and 
atrocity in the war," to Mr. Davis's "extreme moral 
timidity.The Examiner carried the full text of the 
Proclamation in the front page and introduced it with the 
statement that it was "the most important feature of the 
news from the North." The editor declared that the United 
States Government had "shot its bolt." The only serious 
importance of the Proclamation was the indication that the 
North would "stop at nothing in prosecuting the War." The 
Examiner saw in the edict a "call for the insurrection of 
four million slaves, and the inauguration of a reign of 
hell upon earth. 
The Richmond Whig adjudged the Proclamation an 
important landmark in the history of the war; and said it 
served to show the stage at which Northern opinion had 
arrived. The Whig agreed with the other journals that the 
^^Edward A. Pollard, Life of Jefferson Davis With A 
Secret History of the Southern Confederacy (Philadelphia: 
National Publishing Co., 1869), pp. 252-253. Hereafter 
cited as Pollard, Secret History. 
^^Richmond Examiner, Sept. 29, 1862. 
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Proclamation was the "last resort of a defeated, perplexed, 
and desperate government." This, according to the whig, was 
23 
a good sxgn for the South. The Richmond Dispatch described 
the emancipation policy as nothing new because as they saw 
the war, it was an abolition contest from the beginning. 
"Yankees have stolen and set free all the Negroes who were 
willing to go where ever their soldiers had possession of 
the country. 
The Charleston Mercury was known for its extreme 
position in favor of secession. During the war years, it was 
owned and edited by Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., son of the 
former United States Senator and fire-brand secessionist of 
that name. Rhett, though intensely loyal to the Confederate 
cause, fulminated against the "imbecility" of Davis and the 
25 
Confederate Government in general. On September 30, the 
Mercury published the text of the Proclamation without 
comment. On the following day it published an editorial 
on the measure explaining the edict as a "stroke of desperate 
^^Richmond Whig, Sept. 29, 1862. 
^"^Richmond Dispatch cited in Harper ' s Weekly, 
Oct. 18, 1862. 
^^Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 366. 
^^Charleston Mercury, Sept. 30- 1862. 
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statesmanship" and argued that it would have no effect on 
the Negro population. By further discussion of the behavior 
of the colored population, however, the Mercury revealed its 
apprehension that the Proclamation might have had some effect 
p 7 
on the general conduct of the Negro. 
The Southern press, which operated under greater 
limitations both in terms of war intelligence and fewer funds 
than the newspapers of the North, devoted much space to 
reprinting Northern editorials critical of the Proclamation.^® 
The Richmond Examiner published the critical comments of the 
New York papers, the Herald, the World, and the Journal of 
29 
Commerce. The Richmond Whig carried an editorial by the 
New York Albion which denounced Lincoln's decree as an 
"atrocious proclamation."^^ The New Orleans Daily Picayune 
did not favor the idea of emancipation; but only five months 
earlier (April 29, 1862) the resistance of New Orleans had 
been overwhelmed by the Union forces; consequently the 
Picayune reprinted critical Northern measures which were 
^^Charleston Mercury, Oct. 1, 1862. 
^^Mott, American Journalism, pp. 364-36 5. 
^^Richmond Examiner, Sept. 29 and Oct. 16, 1862. 
^QRichmond Whig, Oct. 3, 1862. 
- 12 9 -
employed by General Butler and the Union army.^^ The 
Picayune explained that the Emancipation Proclamation v/as 
not a general measure that would liberate the slaves, but 
was another expression of the Confiscation policy. With 
this explanation, they reprinted the Boston Post's statement 
that the Proclamation indicated that Lincoln had fallen into 
the hands of the "radical revolutionary party.In a 
later edition, the Picayune announced that an 
inquest had been held upon the bodies of twenty-
one contrabands ̂ ^ound deady in one house alone 
in that city. These poor Negroes had been stolen 
or enticed away from the comfortable homes of 
their masters, and left to starve and rot by 
these philanthropic (?) advocates of liberty for 
the slave.33 
Aside from the campaign to portray the Proclamation 
as an attempt by Northern abolitionists to delude the slaves, 
and the reassurance that the proclamation would be inoperative 
in the South, two fears were prevalent in Southern editorial 
comment. One was the fear of servile insurrection that would 
be inspired by Lincoln's act. The Examiner declared that 
^^Thomas Ewing Dabney, One-Hundred Great Years; The 
Story of the Times Picayune (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1944), pp. 160-151. 
^^New Orleans Daily Picayune, Oct. 11, 1862. 
^^Ibid.. cited in Charleston Courier, Feb. 16, 1863. 
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the Proclamation "ordained" a slave revolt and that "it was 
not for a moment misunderstood in the North or in the 
South. The other fear was that it would interfere with 
foreign recognition of the Confederacy. Some editorials 
intimated that the South suspected the European powers would 
not recognize the Confederacy because they (the European 
powers) believed, and even hoped, the North was going to 
win the war. The Arkansas State Gazette exclaimed: "No 
harm will be done in Europe ̂ ^[because of the Emancipation 
Proclamatiory', for recognition will come when the last hope 
is gone of ̂ ^he Confederacy^ being crushed by the 
abolitionists."35 
It was said in the North, that the South intended to 
affect European opinion by describing horrors as contemplated 
in their press releases. Still, because of the closeness 
3^Richmond Examiner, Oct- 1. 1862. 
^^Arkansas State Gazette, Oct. 11, 1862. 
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of 3. possible seirvile insuirirection, it is easy to believe 
that these expressed fears were real.^^ 
The Times of London, which, at the outset of the 
American Civil War, insisted on the folly of secession rather 
37 
than its impossibility, was among the leading journals 
attacking the Emancipation Proclamation. The Times, 
probably the most influential news organ in the world, at 
least according to Lincoln,refused to accept the 
Proclamation as evidence of any high moral purpose. Charles 
MacKay, The Times correspondent at Richmond, wrote that the 
Proclamation was "promulgated as a sop to keep England and 
France quiet." MacKay also contributed a leading article 
in The Times which closely paralleled the concept the 
3 6 Some Northern journals described the South's claim 
that the Proclamation invited slaughter and raping as 
"bugaboo" stories and "mere moonshine" designed to affect 
opinion in Europe. These Northern analysts claimed that the 
only thing the "Rebels" feared was the loss of "Four hundred 
millions of property. " "This is the awful prospect that 
unmans them," they said, and "it is this which convulses the 
rebel newspapers and has thrown their Congress into paroxysms 
of anguish." See Harper's Weekly, Oct. 18, 1852. 
^^History of The Times, p. 381. 
^^Lincoln reportedly told William Russell, The Times 
correspondent of London in the United States, that "The 
London Times is one of the greatest powers in the world, in 
fact, I don't know anything which has more power,—except 
perhaps the Mississippi". William Howard Russell, My Diary 
North and South (New York: Harper, 1864), p. 39. 
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Confederate State Department wished to convey to the British 
Foreign Minister, Lord John Russell. MacKay's article 
attacked Lincoln as "a sort of moral American Pope" whose 
decree was "to go into remote States where his temporal 
powers cannot be made manifest.Two weeks later The 
Times prophesied that the new policy would earn for the 
President the title of "Lincoln the Last."'^^ Though The 
Times criticized the Proclamation, it never advocated 
British recognition of Southern independence- Yet, as the 
voice of the British commoner became more pronounced in 
favor of the North, The Times appeared to be struggling to 
turn the tide. After the final Proclamation was issued. 
The Times argued that the Bible justified slavery, and that 
it might be the duty of the Negroes to refuse the liberty 
promised. In any case, the London newspaper assured its 
readers that the Negro was "being only used as a means to 
forward the ends of the North. A few days later The 
Times, in a leading article, insisted that the Northern 
Government was the oppressor, and that the South was fighting 
^^The Times (London), Oct. 6, 1862. 
'^^Ibid., Oct. 21, 1862. 
"^^Ibid. , Jan. 15, 1863. 
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foic the cause of fireedoiti "against a cruel and desolating" 
invader 
In view of the close approximation to "total commit­
ment" to the cause of separation, and the actual—if not 
admitted connection—between the institution of slavery and 
the "War for Southern Independence," it probably would have 
meant political suicide for any Southern statesman to have 
suggested that the slaves should be freed. Accordingly it 
appeared that public sentiment in the South piped the tune 
while the politicians danced. Governor Zebulon B. Vance 
of North Carolina, faced with the loss of several districts 
to Union forces and opposed by many citizens who were 
considered disloyal to the Confederate cause, attempted to 
use the Emancipation Proclamation as a rallying feature. 
Speaking to his State's legislature, the Governor reminded 
the Congressmen that their labors were for the salvation of 
of their people, and that they had to swallow the bitter 
pill of captured cities and districts. Governor Vance 
declared that the lost regions suffered a "bitter" fate, 
which served to show the mercy North Carolina could expect 
from their abolition foes if they should be overtaken. 
42 ^^Ibid., Jan. 19, 1863. 
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"In the bitterness of their baffled rage," said Vance, "they 
have shown a determination to re-enact the horrors of Santo 
Domingo, and to let loose the hellish passions of servile 
insurrection to revel in the desolation of our homes. 
Vance did succeed in convincing the North Carolina legislature 
of the need to call for 10,000 troops, but they were in need 
of supplies and equipment to outfit the men. The Governor 
sent a request to Jefferson Davis to provide the 
. . 44 
necessities. 
From Georgia, Governor Joseph E. Brown forwarded a 
joint Resolution of the Georgia legislature which requested 
the return of 25,000 pounds of the 160,000 pounds of powder 
it had loaned the Confederacy. Brown explained that trouble 
was anticipated with the slaves during the approaching 
holidays (presumably Christmas and New Year holidays of 
4 S 1862). President Jefferson Davis sent a general letter 
to the Confederate Governors in which he explained the 
impending circumstances. Although, according to Davis, 
the Federal forces had been thwarted in their "nefarious 
.R. , Series 4, Vol. II, p. 190. 
"^^Ibid. . p. 210. 
"^^Ibid. , p. 208. 
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design to subjugate" the Confederate States, he called 
attention to the buildup of the Union forces in preparation 
for a new invasion- The Confederate President explained 
that the North now had a manifest distaste of failure in 
warfare conducted according to the rules of civilized nations. 
In view of this. President Davis declared that the United 
States, in addition to the enormous land and naval forces 
accumulated, planned to add "such African slaves of the South 
as they may be able to wrest from their powers to inflict 
the horrors of a servile war." He then called for a 
concerted effort on the part of state governments to assist 
the Confederation in repelling the coming attacks. Davis 
thus refused the requests for powder and other necessities 
46 by the various states. Apparently he thought it was more 
important to deal with the invading armies than to worry 
about slave uprisings. 
The Emancipation Proclamation was also used as a reason 
for suspending the writ of habeas corpus in some vicinities. 
John A. Campbell, former Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, and now (Oct. 2, 1862) Acting Secretary of War under 
the Confederacy, attempted to relieve the doubts of the 
^^Ibid.. p. 211. 
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provost-marshall at Atlanta, Georgia about the legality 
of performing his duties, which included the issuance of 
orders declaring martial law and suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus in that vicinity. Campbell explained that 
the "entire military population of the Confederacy had been 
appropriated by law for the public defense." He believed 
that the enemy was seeking "to find an ally among those of 
our own household and to add a servile /insurrectio^ to the 
horrors of a civil war." This justified the course taken 
at Atlanta according to Secretary Campbell, but he 
cautioned that "no advantage should be taken of the 
exigencies of the time to inflict any injustices."47 
As the preliminary Proclamation was an announcement 
to declare free, at a future date, the slaves of the South, 
the Confederate Congress hoped to secure its withdrawal, or 
at least arrest its execution. The Confederate Government, 
therefore, moved to condemn it in a formal resolution. The 
resolution pronounced the Proclamation a violation of the 
usages of civilized warfare, an attack on private property, 
and am invitation to servile insurrection. The resolution 
further declared that the edict "should be held up to the 
.R. . Series 1, Vol. XVI, Part 2. p. 980. 
- 137 -
execration of mankind, and counteracted by such retaliatory 
measures" as the President might in his discretion use to 
4R discourage any attempts to enforce the measure. The 
wording of this resolution may be considered mild when 
compared to the speeches and propositions that were brought 
before the Confederate Congress to initiate this official 
resporlse. Confederate Senator, John B. Clark of Missouri, 
was in favor of declaring every citizen of the Southern 
Confederacy a soldier authorized to put to death every man 
caught on Southern soil:, in arms against the government. 
Gustavus A. Henry, Senator from Tennessee^said that the 
resolution did not go far enough. He favored the passage 
of a law providing that upon any attempt being made to 
execute the Proclamation of Lincoln, the Confederates 
should immediately hoist the "black flag" and proclaim a war 
49 of extermination upon all invaders of their soil. 
In the Confederate House of Representatives the 
members gave the appearance of trying to outdo each other 
in contributing the severest denunciatory language and 
48 
Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States 
of America (Washington: Gov- Printing Office, 1904), II, 
pp. 375-375, 393. Hereafter cited as Journal of the 
Confederate Congress. 
A Q 
Pollard, Secret History, p. 254. 
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suggesting retaliatory measures. James Lyons, Representative 
from Virginia, offered a resolution with a preamble 
describing the Proclamation as the "most inhuman and 
atrocious" ever issued by "men or power professing to be 
civilized." The resolution offered by Mr. Lyons exhorted 
the people of the Confederacy to kill and destroy, by all 
means available, every officer, soldier, and sailor of the 
Union forces who was not a "regular prisoner of war." The 
Representative further resolved that, after the intended 
decree of January first was issued, no officers of the Union 
forces should be captured alive, and if they were so 
captured they should be hanged immediately. But Representa­
tive Lyons felt these measures in themselves were not enough 
and sought to encourage the slaves and free Negroes of the 
South to slay men of the "Lincolnite Army and Navy" by 
offering a bounty of twenty dollars for each sailor or soldier 
50 
killed by them plus an annuity of twenty dollars for life. 
Ten days later (Oct. 11, 1862), a bill was introduced 
into the Confederate House designed to sustain President 
Davis in whatever measures of retaliation he deemed necessary 
in face of the "lawless and barbarous conduct and designs 
^^Journal of the Confederate Congress, V, p. 459. 
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of the enemy." The bill was the result of a series of 
propositions each outlining a number of atrocities which 
the Representatives felt required the Government of the 
Confederate States to endeavor to punish and repress "by 
inflicting severe retribution." Of all the atrocities 
listed, the most prevalent was President Lincoln's Emanci­
pation Proclamation which was described as a diabolical 
measure designed to involve slaves, owners, women, and 
children in "one common ruin," for maintaining power "by 
catering to the fanatical spirit of abolitionism." General 
P. G. T. Beauregard, the first Confederate hero, telegraphed 
W. Porcher Miles, the South Carolina Representative with 
whom Beauregard communicated frequently. The General asked 
if the bill had passed authorizing the execution of 
abolition prisoners after January, 1863. He then urged: 
"Do it and England will be stirred into action. It is high 
time to proclaim the black flag. Let the execution be with 
the garrots."^^ In discussing the probable measures for 
retaliation, and always with an eye to possible British 
recognition, the House did allude to the rights of the 
Confederacy as belligerents. It was suggested that captives 
.R., Series 2, Vol. IV, p. 915. 
- 140 -
who supported the Proclamation, be executed. The Confederate 
Congress, however, disregarded Beauregard's request and 
committed the question of retaliation to the discretion of 
52 the Executive. 
Aside from expressions of fear as to the results of 
the Proclamation, attempts to affect foreign opinion, and 
the construction of retaliatory measures, some newspapers 
and officials saw merit in Lincoln's decree. On October 18, 
1862, the Richmond Examiner published an article mentioning 
the value the "Yankees" had found in the use of the "stolen 
tens of thousands of Negroes as teamsters, laborers in 
camp., etc." and suggested that the slaveholders should be 
more generous in hiring out Negroes for the Confederate 
army. The Examiner attacked the slaveholder for being 
averse to such use of his property and stated that the war 
had originated and was being carried on in great part for 
the defense of the slaveholder in his property, rights, and 
the perpetuation of the institution of slavery- The journal 
asserted that it was only reasonable to expect the slave­
holder to be "first and foremost in aiding and assisting, 
by every means in his power, the triumph and success of our 
^^Journal of the Confederate Congress, V, pp. 543-547. 
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arms." The Examiner also pointed out that the Negro would 
receive good care and good wages, and that the "slaveholder 
ought to remember that for every Negro he furnishes, he puts 
a soldier in the ranks.Despite its good intentions, the 
Examiner felt a backlash when in November the Raleigh 
Standard of North Carolina denounced the Confederate war 
effort as a struggle in the interests of wealthy slave­
holders. "It is a rich man's war and poor man's fight" 
cried the Standard's editor, W. W. Holden. The Standard's 
editor was also head of the "Order of Heroes of America," 
which was the counterpart of the Copperhead's "Order of the 
54 
Golden Circle" in the North. Holden experienced some 
success in getting citizens of North Carolina organized to 
resist the Confederate conscription. Although some 
Unionists felt that the Proclamation prostrated their 
5 5 efforts in resisting Confederate authorities, editor 
Holden continued to insist that North Carolina had done more 
than her share and that her people ought to contribute no 
further. The results of Holden's efforts proved to be an 
^^Richmond Examiner, Oct. 18. 1862. 
^^Mott, American Journalism, p. 357. 
^^Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy 
(New York; The Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 28. 
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ominous threat not only to the enrolling officers, but also 
to the maintenance of North Carolina in the Confederacy.^^ 
Another attempt by the Confederates to use the 
Emancipation Proclamation was in the effort to separate the 
border states from their allegiance to the Union. While the 
Arkansas State Gazette expressed the hope that the 
Proclamation would cause unwavering support of the border 
states for the South against a government bent on abolition-
57 
ism. Confederate General S. S. Buckner had already urged 
the "freemen" of Kentucky to join the Confederate army. The 
General addressed "The Freeman of Kentucky" and proceeded 
to explain the means by which all the principles cherished 
by Kentuckians had been subverted by the Northerners. "No 
sooner had they been placed in power than, in violation of 
their repeated pledges," said General Buckner, "they 
joined in the abolition crusade against the South." He 
declared that if any doubts had existed before as to the 
designs of the Northern Government, they should have been 
dispelled by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. "Will 
you light the servile torch which is to involve our own 
homes in the general conflagration, and draw upon ourselves 
.R., Series 4, Vol. II, pp. 783-785. 
^^Arkansas State Gazette, Oct. 11, 1862. 
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the contempt and derision of the abolition despots, who 
view us only as the tame instruments to carry out their 
will?" the General asked. Buckner then informed the 
Kentuckians that the Generals, Braxton Bragg and Kirby-Smith, 
were in the vicinity and that they came to relieve the Blue-
grass State from the tyranny of the North, He promised that 
no peaceable citizen would be molested. "We make war only 
against armed men," he said, "not as our enemies do, against 
58 peaceable citizens and defenseless women and children." 
General Bragg, not long after Buckner's recruiting speech, 
withdrew his troops from Kentucky. He blamed the 
Kentuckians' lack of co-operation as the major explanation 
59 
for his action. It seemed that although the citizen of 
Kentucky harbored animosity against the abolitionists, they 
were even more resolved to resist secession. 
The Confederates, however, did not lose hope that 
the sister slave states of the border would join them in 
their cause. After the final Proclamation confirmed 
Lincoln's intent to carry out the Emancipation policy, the 
Southern press again scoffed at the value of the Proclamation 
^^O.R., Series I, Vol. LII, Part 2, pp. 350-361. 
^^Kenneth P- Williams, Lincoln Finds A General 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), IV, p. 136. 
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and denounced the intended "wickedness" of such an edict. 
The Charleston Courier jeered, "The Pope's bull against the 
comet has been issued, and I suppose Mr. Lincoln now breathes 
more freely. The wonderful man by a dash of the pen has set 
free (on paper) all the slaves of the South, and henceforth 
this is to be in all its length and breadth the land of 
liberty The Richmond Whig merely reprinted the text of 
the Proclamation under the caption, "The Latest 'Bull' from 
Lincoln," and explained that it was a part of the history of 
fi 1_ the war. The Augusta, (Georgia) Chronicle and Sentinel 
announced that Lincoln had issued the promised edict and 
noted that they saw "no portentous signs of calamity, either 
in the heavens or on earth." The sun was observed as "not 
darkened" and the moon had not "turned into blood." The 
editor observed that Northern people would not succeed in 
destroying the institution of slavery; and in attempting 
to do so would only bring ruin on themselves. The Augusta 
paper described it as madness and offered the explanation 
that "whom God wishes to destroy he first deprives of 
reason." The Nashville Dispatch expressed the same 
^^Charleston Daily Courier, Feb. 16, 1853 
^^Richmond Whig, Jan. 7, 1853. 
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6 2 
sentiments. The Richmond Dispatch took into account the 
recent Confederate victories and argued that the South need 
not answer Lincoln's Proclamation by words, as the North had 
been answered at Fredericksburg and Murfre#sboro . The 
Savannah Republican believed that as far as the border 
States were concerned, the Proclamation would have the 
opposite effect of that for which it was intended. The 
Republican asserted that those slave States which remained 
loyal to the Union in the belief that their Southern 
sisters were hasty and wrong about the abolitionist intent 
of the Union Government, "will now see that they were right 
and that all their worst apprehensions have been justified 
by the acts of that government. The Richmond Examiner 
found it hard to decide whether wickedness or folly 
predominated. The journal described the Proclamation as 
the "most startling political crime, the most stupid 
political blunder yet known in American History," and they 
predicted it would receive "universal condemnation and 
contempt in Europe." The Examiner then concluded that the 
^^Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, Jan. 9, 1863; 
Nashville Dispatch, Jan. 6, 1863. 
6 3 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 6, 1863. 
64 
Savannah Republican, Mar. 6, 1863. 
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Proclamation would have a salutary effect on the people of 
the South. The paper declared that the Proclamation "shuts 
the door of retreat and repentance on the weak and the 
timid.Probably the "weak and the timid" to which the 
Examiner referred were not only those who were disloyal while 
mder Confederate jurisdiction, but also those who had 
fallen to Union forces, and acted on the issuance of the 
preliminary edict to gain readmittance to the Union before 
the end of the one-hundred day grace period.^^ 
^-^Richmond Examiner, Jan. 7, 1853. 
^^After Lincoln had issued the Proclamation of 
September 22, John F. Bouligny, who was then in Washington, 
asked President Lincoln if the thirteen parishes of 
Louisiana and New Orleans which were in the hands of Union 
forces could be excepted from the final edict. Bouligny 
explained that loyal Unionists would be elected to take 
their seats in the Federal Congress if the exceptions could 
be made. The President assured Bouligny this could be done 
and directed George F. Shepley, the Military Governor of 
Louisiana, to get an election under way so that the results 
would be in before January 1, 1863. The election took place 
on December 3, 1852 and resulted in the election of Benjamin 
F. Flanders and Michael Hahn. Mr. Hahn became the first 
governor of the re-established state of Louisiana in 
February of 1864. See Allen Thorndike Rice, Reminiscences 
of Abraham Lincoln (New York: The North American Review, 
1885), p. 92; and Roy P. Easier (ed.). The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), V, pp. 487-488, 505; Ibid -, VII, 
p. 243. 
Similar action took place in the parts of Virginia 
that were excluded from the operation of the Proclamation. 
General Dix in command of the Union forces in the excepted 
counties of Virginia explained that the citizens there were 
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Virginia's Confederate Governor, John Letcher, 
declared to the Senate and House of Delegates of Virginia 
that Lincoln's Proclamation violated all principles of 
humanity, and disregarded all social, moral and political 
obligations. Letcher cited the paragraph of the Proclamation 
which declared that "within any state or designated part of 
a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion 
against the United States," slaves "thenceforward and for­
ever" would be free. The Governor termed this provision an 
exhibition of depravity- He contended that the country had 
never witnessed such a display of atrociousness as he found 
6 V manifested in the emancipatory decree. 
From the time of the issuance of the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation through the issuance of the final 
"desirous of an opportunity" to show their "fidelity to the 
Government and of securing their exemption from the 
penalties of disloyalty, by electing a member of Congress" 
who would represent them by the first of January, 1853. The 
returns from the election (Dec. 31, 1862) showed Mr. John B. 
McCloud the successful candidate. Although this portion of 
Virginia initially escaped the penalties of the Proclamation, 
the Federal House of Representatives refused to receive 
their Representative. See Lincoln; Collected Works, VI, 
p. 26 . 
6 V 
Governor's Messages, January 19, 1853, Edward 
Channing, A History of the United States (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1925), VI, p. 545, citing Documents Extra 
Sessions, 1862-63, No. 10, of the Virginia Legislature. 
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Proclamation, the Southern newspapers had launched their 
attacks, the Governors, Representatives and other officials 
of the separate Confederate States had made known their 
opposition to the decree. On January 12, 1863 the Confederate 
President, Jefferson Davis, gave the official Executive 
reaction to the Proclamation. President Davis announced to 
the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Confederate 
States that the "enemy" had been thwarted in its past two 
attempts to force the Confederate States back into the 
Union and to conquer and rule these States as dependent 
provinces. Now, he declared, the "enemies have evidently 
entered upon another, which can have no other purpose than 
revenge and thirst for blood and plunder of private property." 
In the same address, Davis made specific reference to the 
Proclamation. He described it as a measure which doomed 
"an inferior race" to extermination and at the same time 
encouraged servile insurrection by the insidious 
recommendation "to abstain from violence unless in necessary 
self-defense." Defining the decree as "the most execrable 
measure recorded in the history of guilty man" the 
Confederate Chief Executive explained that the South's 
detestation was tempered by the contempt it had for the 
impotency of such a measure. President Davis acknowledged 
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receipt of the retaliatory measures suggested by the 
Confederate Congress but he informed Congress that, unless 
he later saw reason for a different method, he would have 
all the Union officers that were captured by the Confederate 
forces turned over to the State authorities. The States 
would deal with the captives in accordance with the laws 
provided for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting 
a servile insurrection. The captured enlisted men should be 
returned to their homes on the proper and usual parole. 
The Confederacy's President Davis viewed the 
political aspects of the Proclamation as significant in 
that the whole South was afforded "the complete and crowning 
proof" of the true nature of the Republican party. He 
recalled the earlier pledge of the Union President in his 
first inaugural not to interfere with the institution of 
slavery, and the pledges of both the President and the 
Congress of the Union not to destroy the domestic insti­
tutions of the individual states. According to Davis, this 
proved the sagacity of the South in perceiving the intention 
of the Republican party from the beginning. President Davis 
declared that the people of the South were thankful they had 
got out of the Union in time to escape the "consequences now 
apparent to the most skeptical." The Confederate President 
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further explained that the Proclamation rendered the 
restoration of the Union impossible. It had created 
circumstances which could "lead to but one of three 
possible consequences—the extermination of the slaves, 
the exile of the whole white population from the Confed­
eracy, or absolute and total separation of these States 
from the United States." In conclusion, Davis maintained 
that the Proclamation was evidence that the North could not 
subjugate the South by force of arms and as such "must be 
accepted by neutral nations, which can no longer find any 
justification in withholding" the South's claims to formal 
recognition. 
The Confederate Congress considered President Davis' 
message and responded with a resolution stating that 
commissioned officers of the enemy ought not to be delivered 
to the authorities of the respective States, but that all 
captives taken by the Confederate forces ought to be dealt 
with and disposed of by the Confederate Government. The 
Legislative body reiterated its previous suggestion as to 
possible modes of retaliation, and it reaffirmed its 
declaration that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
6 8 
0 .R. . Series 4, Vol. II, pp. 336-347. 
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"inconsistent with the spirit of thoseusages which in 
modern warfare prevail among civilized nations." In 
addition to this action, the Confederate Congress voted 
into law a measure defining what behavior constituted support 
of the Proclamation and provided in each instance, that the 
"criminal" would be put to death or be otherwise punished 
at the discretion of the court. Retaliation for the 
Emancipation Proclamation seemed no longer to be at the 
discretion of the Confederate Chief Executive; instead, 
fi Q there was a law which he was designated to execute. E. A. 
Pollard described the attitude between the Confederate 
Congress and President Davis on this issue. The author 
sarcastically noted that the law was never carried out in 
a single instance. He claimed that President Davis never 
paid any attention to the Congressional corrections except 
to stop writing "gloomy and vaporizing messages about 
7 0 taking vengeance upon the enemy^ 
As the Union forces began to effect the emancipation 
measure with the enlistment of Negro troops, the Confederate 
Government was again confronted with the problem of how to 
^^Journal of the Confederate Congress, VI, pp. 486-487. 
^*^Pollard, Secret History, p. 258. 
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deal with prisoners. Except in this case the difficulty was 
that the prisoners were in some instances Negroes who were 
captured in arms. One of the first impulses of the 
Confederate Congress was to establish a depot where the 
captured Negroes could be properly segregated. Those found 
to be fugitives from their masters were to be restored to 
their rightful owners. Those for whom no masters could be 
found were to be sold into perpetual bondage. It was 
suggested that the sale of this second group would provide 
funds to reimburse citizens of the Confederacy who had lost 
their slave property due to enemy efforts.Another 
suggestion, offered by Thomas D. McDowell of North Carolina, 
was to adopt a bill providing for the sale of all Negroes 
taken in arms against the Confederate States, the 
proceeds to be divided among the troops engaged in their 
7 2 . . 
capture. Some members felt that the practice of selling 
captured Negroes was not suited to the purpose of the 
armed forces and they argued that unless the Negroes were 
fugitive slaves, they should become the property of their 
73 
captors to be held and considered thereafter as slaves. 
^^Journal of the Confederate Congress, Vol. VI, p. 90. 
^^Ibid., p. 103. 
^^Ibid., p. 129. 
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While the plans for the disposition of captured 
Negroes were being discussed in Congress, the Confederate 
Army was attempting to find the answer to the problem of 
dealing with those already on hand. General Mercier had 
four Negroes who had been captured wearing the Federal 
Uniform. One of the Negroes came into the possession of 
two brokers who put him up for sale in Savannah, Georgia. 
Mercier requested that the Negro be returned to his authority 
and wrote to the assistant adjutant-general of the Depart­
ment of South Carolina and Georgia for instructions on how 
to handle the matter. The assistant adjutant-general. 
General T. Jordan, brought the matter before the Department 
Commander, General Beaureguard, who brought it to the 
attention of the Secretary of War, James A. Seddon who 
74 
in turn referred the matter to President Jefferson Davis. 
The Chief Executive then wrote General Beaureguard that the 
slaves were in flagrant rebellion and subject to death by 
the laws of every slaveholding state. He explained that 
too much time and inconvenience would be involved if the 
army attempted to handle the disposition of the Negro captives 
through civil tribunals, and, therefore, he declared that 
"^^O.R. . Series 2, Vol. IV, pp. 945-946. 
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summary execution must be inflicted. To guard against abuse 
of this grave power under the immediate excitement of 
capture or through overzeal, Mr. Davis decreed that the 
discretion of deciding and giving the order of execution 
should be vested in the general commanding in the special 
locality of the capture. In this specific case. President 
Davis told General Beaureguard to instruct General Mercier 
to exercise this discretion in the case of the slaves 
75 referred to by him. General Mercier was of the opinion 
that his captives should be "made an example of," and that 
some "swift and terrible punishment should be inflicted" 
"7 
to deter other Negroes from following this example. 
The Confederate Congress, evidently believed that the 
President was exercising too much authority over the matter, 
and adopted a joint resolution stating that all Negroes and 
Mulattoes who engaged in the war or were taken in arms 
against the Confederacy were to be turned over to the au­
thorities of the states in which they were captured to be 
77 
dealt with according to the existing laws of that state. 
75 
Ibid., p. 954. 
^^Ibid., p. 946. 
Journal of the Confederate Congress, Vol. VI, 
p. 487. 
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A strict adherence to the state laws meant that the Negroes 
would be put to death.The Confederate legislative body 
later resolved to consider the expediency of a law to 
establish the status of a Negro prisoner prior to his 
enlistment into the Union forces. Those discovered to 
have been slaves were to be returned to servitude. The free 
Negro enlistee was to be considered either a prisoner of war 
or an inciter of servile rebellion (May, 1863).^^ The South, 
however, refused to treat the Negro as a prisoner of war 
p r\ 
until the last months of the rebellion. 
The conflicting resolutions of the Confederate 
Congress plus the confusion engendered by the contrasting 
opinions of the authorities as to the disposition of 
captured Negroes frustrated the generals commanding in the 
field. One result of this friction between the Legislature 
and the Executive was the failure to establish a standard 
operating procedure for commanders in the field. This in 
turn created a latitude for anarchial behavior in the ranks 
78 According to state laws as existed prior to the 
outbreak of the Civil War. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The 
Peculiar Institution, p. 210. 
Journal of the Confederate Congress, Vol. VI, 
pp. 517, 699. 
^^Ibid.. pp. 737, 828. 
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fair as tireatinsnt of Nsgiro pirisoneirs was conceirnsd. 
General Kirby Smith displayed his irritation with the 
perplexity of the Negro prisoner problem in a letter to 
General Richard Taylor. Kirby Smith expressed the hope 
that Taylor's troops had not captured Negroes in arms, but 
that the officers in command of the capturing parties had 
"recognized the propriety of giving no quarter to armed 
Negroes and their officers." General Kirby Smith explained, 
"in this way we may be relieved of a disagreeable 
O 1 
dilemna." Although there are recorded instances of in­
discriminate slaughter of Negro troops,^2 the Confederate 
army did take the colored soldiers as captives throughout 
the remainder of the war.^^ Confederate President Davis 
later reflected on these perplexing problems and concluded 
that Abraham LinoDln' s Proclamation was artfully designed to 
confuse the Confederates in the conduct of the war.^'^ 
on 
O.R., Series 2, VI, pp. 21-22. 
Q^O.R., Series 1, Vol. XXXII, Part 1, pp. 518-618; 
ibid., Part 3, pp. 361-822 intermittently; Bell Irvin Wiley, 
The Life of Johnny Reb (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1943) , 
pp. 314-315. 
^^O.R., Series 2, Vol. VI, pp. 532-534; ibid., 
Vol. VII, pp. 459-460. 
^^Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government (New York: Appleton and Co., 1881), II, 
pp. 179-180. 
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Upon the Negroes of the South the Proclaination had. 
varied effects. The reactions of the slaves such as those 
remembered by Booker T. Washington, celebrated the edict in 
silence. Washington was sure that the slaves were aware 
(at least in Virginia) of the fact that the Proclamation had 
been issued. Certainly there was no action to suppress the 
information in Southern newspapers. As Booker Washington 
explains the situation where he was a slave, the Negroes 
remained loyal to their masters and performed their duties 
as usual, but the desire for freedom was with them and they 
devoted their prayers to Lincoln and his success.®^ In 
areas such as Louisiana where the Union forces made a 
vigorous effort to implement the Emancipation Proclamation, 
the Negro population began exhibiting increasing restiveness, 
became impudent to the masters, and in some cases engaged 
in the seizure and distrubution of property. One diarist 
wrote of her frightening experience of witnessing armed 
Negroes ransacking her home. She described their manner as 
insolent, their speech as profuse, and their walk as 
swaggering. Though she and her companion were not abused, 
they took the first opportunity to leave the plantation. 
^^Booker T- Washington, Up From Slavery (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1901), p. 5. 
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She explained that other owners followed the same course.®^ 
In other instances where Negroes were still under the 
supervision of their masters or mistresses, the desire to 
experience their newly proclaimed freedom encouraged outright 
desertions. Such was the case with the personal servant to 
President Davis' wife.^^ This also seemed to be the case 
of the many Negroes who joined the already large number of 
fugitives within the Union lines.®® 
John B. Jones, the subject of A Rebel War Clerk's 
Diary, recorded his impressions of the Negroes' conduct 
after the issuance of the Proclamation. On January 7, 1863, 
he noted a large body of slaves passing through the city 
of Richmond, Virginia. He explained that slaves had been 
working on the fortification north of the city and were 
headed toward the southern sector where they would commence 
working on fortifications. He asserted the slaves had "no 
®^Albert D. Kirvan (ed.). The Confederacy (Cleveland: 
World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 149-150. 
®^Varina Jefferson Davis, Jefferson Davis: Ex-Presi­
dent of the Confederate States of America (New York, 
Belford Co., 1890), II, pp. 217-218. 
QO 
O .R. , Series 3, Vol. Ill, pp. 1139-1144; John Eaton, 
Grant, Lincoln and the Freedmen (New York: Longmans and 
Green Co., 1907), pp. 2-16; Mary Boykin Chestnut, A Diary 
From Dixie (London: William Heinemann, 1905), p. 199. 
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faith in the efficacy of Lincoln's Emancipation," but stated 
it was different in NoirfolTc. That city was excepted frorti the 
Proclamation but this did not seem to prevent nearly 4,000 
slaves from demonstrating in an Emancipation jubilee. Jones 
remarked of the slaves, "They will bewail their error; and 
so will the abolitionists." He predicted that the Negroes 
would devour the enemy's food supply, and declared if they 
were armed, the Confederates would gain possession of their 
QQ 
arms.°^ The Negroes who found their way to the islands off 
the coast of South Carolina became free directly upon the 
issuance of the Proclamation. The islands, which were in 
the hands of the Union army and navy were not excepted from 
the Emancipation Proclamation as were other areas under 
Union control. The key position among these islands was 
Port Royal where a large number of Negroes resided. The 
colored inhabitants in Port Royal joined with the whites in 
a celebration of thanks and joy, while antislavery advocates 
^^John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk' s Diary (New York: 
Sagamore Press, Inc., 1958), II, p. 148. 
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took special pride in the fact that at least in this one 
instance, Lincoln's decree was a direct instrument of 
freedom. 
In recollections of the war, many Southerners 
remembered, with gratitude to the Negro, that the colored 
element of the South remained loyal to their masters through­
out the war and did not engage in engineering servile 
91 
insurrections. At the end of the war, the biggest problem 
the South faced was the readjustment to its new social and 
economic life with the presence of four million freed 
Negroes. One Confederate patriot summarized the passing 
event as follows: 
The conflict, with all its death and destruction, 
its sorrows and its suffering, was but the necessary 
baptism of this nation, legitimating its disputed 
birth by a verdict in the high court of war, 
rendered in accordance with the laws of evolution, 
beyond which there is no appeal. 
^^Charlotte L. Forten, The Journal of Charlotte Forten 
(New York: Dryden Press, 1953), pp. 153-157; John H. 
Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (New York: Double-
day and Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 115-118. 
91 
Arney Robinson Childs (ed.), The Private Journal 
of Henry William Revenal, 1859-1887 (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1947), pp. 231-232. 
^^Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs o^ 
Confederate (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), 
p. XXX. 
CONCLUSION 
President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation stands 
forth as an important war measure. As has been shown, the 
Proclamation was not a mere paper bull; when implemented, 
the decree proved to be a formidable instrument that helped 
in the prosecution of the war effort on the part of the 
North and provided a source of confusion, at least of 
annoyance, to the South. Moreover, after the policy of 
freeing the slaves in the areas in rebellion had been set 
forth, the complete abolition of slavery in America 
probably became inevitable. 
The Proclamation was received by the American public 
as an epoch-making document. The newspapers gave the edict 
wide circulation throughout both the North and the South. 
The members of the Union Government debated the best ways 
of capitalizing upon the Proclamation while the Confederacy 
discussed ways of nullifying its effects and sought to use 
the edict as a means of stimulating a greater commitment to 
the Southern cause. As an integral part of the war program, 
it was not surprising that the document was misinterpreted, 
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and that exaggerated notions of its meaning and of President 
Lincoln's intent should have arisen. 
Most abolitionists hailed the Proclamation as a 
clarion call for an end to slavery. The Proclamation 
alienated many of the hesitant or doubtful members of the 
Republican party, and apparently forced the party into a 
more compact, homogeneous organization that, superficially 
at least, gave as its objectives the defeat of the 
secessionists and the destruction of the institution of 
slavery in the process. After the final Proclamation was 
issued. Congress more readily gave President Lincoln the 
support he needed to win the war. 
The secessionists denounced the emancipation edicts 
as open invitations to servile insurrection. The border 
states were urged to join the Confederacy in its struggle 
against the Union government which, because of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, was described as an instrument 
of the abolitionists. The Confederate leaders marked the 
final Proclamation as the point in the war from which there 
could be no turning back. Confederate President Davis told 
his people that the document had created circumstances which 
required the "absolute and total separation" of the 
Confederate states from the United States. The South evinced 
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greater determination to secure its independence, and to 
preserve the institution of slavery. 
Some Americans — from both sections—who may have viewed 
slavery as a woxng, still saw in the Proclamation what was 
even more distateful to them—the possibility of racial 
equality. Their argument was not that the Negroes would 
be elevated but that the whites would be degraded. The 
"Peace Democrats" raised the racist argument against the 
Proclamation and succeeded in undermining the Lincoln 
administration's war efforts to a certain degree. But the 
attacks on the Proclamation from the Democrats also forced 
a more vigorous attention to the provisions of the edicts 
such as colonization and the recruiting of Negroes for 
service in the Union armed forces. 
While the colonization scheme may have helped to allay 
some fears of a Negro inundation of the Northern states, it 
also evoked arguments which amplified the Negroes' claim to 
the United States as more their country than any other place 
in the world in which they might be colonized. The failure 
of colonization attempts and the use of Negroes in the 
military effort, lent greater support to these claims. 
The use of Negroes as fighting men caused concern to 
those who wanted to keep the struggle in the realm of a 
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white man's war. The administration and military leaders, 
who advocated the use of Negroes, were obligated to argue 
that participation in the war gave the Negro a further 
vested interest in this country. 
The Emancipat±)n Proclamation seized the popular 
imagination and placed the Negro race in a new perspective. 
The edict was revolutionary in that it had no precedents 
and it was epoch-making in that it brought the end of 
slavery into view. It caused the question of slavery to 
be emphasized in connection with the preservation of the 
Union. It prompted abolition measures in some of the Union 
slave states, and paved the way for the eradication of 
slavery by a Constitutional amendment. 
Looking at what might be considered as some of the 
negative aspects of the Proclamation, civil and military 
adjustments between the North a nd the South were complicated; 
that is, the interpretation popularly given to the edict 
allowed for no middle ground in problems requiring com­
promise such as in the exchange of prisoners. The South, 
which considered the edict as a capital grievance, launched 
a wave of angry resentment, and the way was open for 
retaliation or, from the Southern point of view, counter-
retaliation. The important social problems of the South 
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were put into the hands of Northerners who lacked the 
experience and compassion needed in dealing with the Negro. 
The future freedom of the Negro, if not his equality with 
the white race, was assured. 
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